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Iskandar, Deden Dinar (2012): 
Dealing With Bribery in an Emission Tax Scheme: Theoretical and 
Experimental Evidence Based on the Indonesian Case 
Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, 118 pages 
 
This dissertation is stemmed from the necessity of finding the optimal mixture 
of emission tax policies that induces the compliance under the presence of 
bribery, by taking the case of Indonesia. The Indonesian government has 
designed the emission tax to prevent environmental degradation attributed to 
the production process of polluting firm.  However, the implementation of 
emission tax may be impeded by several nonmarket issues.  Firstly, there is a 
contradiction of interests regarding the implementation of tax between the 
government and the polluting firms. The firms may incline to undertake the 
actions against the compliance with tax regulation. Secondly, the complication 
of emission taxation escalates when bribery in the taxation office prevails. The 
prevalence of bribery is alleged to provide a disincentive for the tax compliance 
of the firms.    
Motivated by the necessity of emission tax and the nonmarket conditions 
expressed above, the main objective of this dissertation is to provide the clue 
regarding the optimal emission tax schemes that induce the compliance under 
pervasive bribery. In particular, this study aims to contribute to environmental 
policy literature by examining the role of financial reward on emission tax 
compliance under the presence of bribery. The existing literature mostly 
examine the impact of corruption and financial reward on compliance in 
separation, while the combined impact of the reward and bribery has not been 
investigated. 
The objectives of this dissertation are approached using game theoretical and 
experimental methods. These approaches are useful to predict the performance 
of new policy designs, where the relevant empirical data have not been 
established. The common critic on game theoretical approach is that the 
method relies heavily on the assumption that the economic agents are fully 
rational and driven by the benefit maximization motive. Therefore, 
simultaneous use of these approaches is expected to fill the gap between the 
prediction of optimal decisions and the actual economic behaviour.   
Based on the research findings, the proposed emission tax schemes under the 
presence of bribery and costly monitoring would be a combination of low tax 
rate, high sanction for evasion, combined with low financial reward for the 
compliant firms. Enforcement policies directed toward corrupting tax officials 
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that eventually lead to the increase in the cost of bribery is also recommended. 
Theoretical findings indicate that the optimal mixture of enforcement policy on 
tax officials consists of a high financial reward for revealing the tax evasion and 
a lower sanction for taking the bribe.  
iv 
 
Iskandar, Deden Dinar (2012): 
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Der Hintergrund dieser Dissertation liegt in der Notwendigkeit zur Findung 
eines optimalen Mix aus Emissionssteuergesetzgebungen, die deren Einhaltung 
in der Gegenwart von Bestechlichkeit begünstigen, anhand des konkreten Falls 
Indonesien. Die indonesische Regierung hat die Emissionssteuer mit dem Ziel 
entworfen, die Umweltverschmutzung zu begrenzen, die aus dem 
Produktionsprozess verschmutzender Firmen resultiert. Die Umsetzung einer 
Emissionssteuer kann jedoch durch einige marktunabhängige Faktoren 
beeinträchtigt werden. Erstens gibt es einen Interessenkonflikt zwischen 
Regierung und verschmutzenden Firmen hinsichtlich der Einführung der Steuer. 
Demnach könnten Firmen potenziell Maßnahmen ergreifen, die nicht im 
Einklang mit der Steuergesetzgebung stehen. Zweitens wird die 
Emissionsbesteuerung zusätzlich erschwert, wenn Bestechlichkeit der 
Steuerbehörden gegeben ist. Das Vorhandensein von Bestechlichkeit wird als 
Anreiz zur Nichteinhaltung der Steuergesetze durch die Firmen angesehen. 
Angesichts der Notwendigkeit einer Emissionssteuer und der oben 
beschriebenen, marktunabhängigen Faktoren ist das Hauptziel dieser 
Dissertation die Beschreibung einer optimalen Emissionssteuergesetzgebung, 
die zu einer Einhaltung derselben angesichts allgegenwärtiger Korruption führt. 
Insbesondere soll diese Studie einen Beitrag zur aktuellen 
Umweltpolitikliteratur liefern, indem sie die Rolle von finanziellen Belohnungen 
bei der Einhaltung von Emissionssteuergesetzen vor dem Hintergrund von 
Bestechlichkeit beleuchtet.  Die bisherige Literatur beschäftigt sich indes 
überwiegend mit den unabhängigen Einflüssen von Korruption und finanziellen 
Belohnungen auf die Einhaltung von Gesetzen, während der gleichzeitige 
Einfluss von Belohnung und Bestechung noch nicht untersucht wurde. 
Die Fragestellungen dieser Dissertation werden mittels spieltheoretischer und 
experimenteller Ansätze untersucht. Diese Methoden bieten sich an, um 
Prognosen zur Wirksamkeit neuartiger Gesetzgebungsmodelle zu erstellen, zu 
denen noch keine relevanten empirischen Beobachtungen verfügbar sind. 
Allgemein wird kritisiert, dass der spieltheoretische Ansatz stark auf der 
Annahme vollkommen rationaler und Nutzen maximierender Agenten beruht. 
Entsprechend kann man erwarten, dass durch die Lücke zwischen der 
Vorhersage optimaler Entscheidungen und tatsächlichem ökonomischem 
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Verhalten durch die gleichzeitige Anwendung der beiden genannten 
methodischen Ansätze geschlossen werden kann.  
Basierend auf den Forschungsergebnissen bestünde das empfohlene 
Steuermodell unter der Annahme von Bestechlichkeit aus einer Kombination 
aus einem niedrigen Steuersatz, hohen Strafen für Steuerhinterziehung und 
einer geringen finanziellen Belohnung für Firmen, die sich an die Gesetze 
halten. Außerdem empfehlen sich Maßnahmen zur Durchsetzung, die auf 
korrupte Finanzbeamte abzielen und ultimativ zu einem höheren Kosten von 
Bestechlichkeit führen. Theoretische Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine optimale 
Mischung von Durchsetzungsmaßnahmen mit dem Fokus auf Finanzbeamte aus 
hohen finanziellen Belohnungen zur Aufdeckung von Steuerhinterziehung und 
niedrigeren Strafen für die Annahme von Bestechungsgeldern besteht. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The subject of this dissertation is motivated by the necessity of regulation in 
environmental management.   The role of environmental regulation is 
stemming from the problem of externality, a situation in which the actions of 
one economic agent affect the utility of others in an uncompensated way.  In 
the absence of regulations, the social cost resulting from the actions of the 
economic agents will exceed the private cost and the environmental quality 
will be compromised.  Since the market cannot define the private property 
rights for the environmental quality, the government intervention to 
regulate environmental problems becomes necessary (Siebert, 2008).   
 The primary objective of environmental regulation is to restrict 
environmental damage and to maintain the utilization of the environment at 
the efficient level, which allows the economic agents bearing the full 
implication of their actions (Crew and parker (ed), 2006). Environmental 
regulations are commonly classified into two broad categories, command-
and-control and market-based instruments. Command-and-control refers to 
a direct regulation applied at various stages of production. This instrument 
may prevent the use of inputs or production techniques if they are 
considered dangerous for the environment.  Direct regulation could also be 
directed to set the quota of the produced goods and the emitted pollutants. 
While the command-and-control instruments constrain the polluting firms 
with rigidity in achieving the environmental goals, market-based instruments 
provide the firms with a greater range of choices in achieving environmental 
improvement along with incentives to encourage the environmental 
improvement in a more effective way. Market-based instruments provide the 
flexibility to firms to decide what level of environmental efforts they intend 
to establish, considering the economic incentive they expect to obtain (Hahn 
and Stavin, 1992).  Economists believe that market-based instruments will 
work more efficiently in achieving environmental objectives than the 
command-and-control, since these instruments delegate the decision 
making to the polluting firms with private information regarding firm-specific 
cost of pollutant reduction (Hahn and Stavin, 1992; Crew and parker (ed), 
2006).  Different firms can determine a different level of production, and the 
corresponding pollutant generation, regarding the expected economic 
incentive from the instruments.  One of the most commonly discussed 
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market-based instruments is the emission tax. Emission tax is defined as a 
tax levied on the physical unit (or the substitute of it) that has a negative 
effect on the environment (Fullerton et al., 2008). The tax is not only 
projected to reduce the emitted pollutant, but also expected to generate 
revenue for the government to improve social welfare (double dividend 
hypothesis). 
In the case of Indonesia, the cost of environmental degradation has been 
highlighted in the Country Environmental Analysis by World Bank (2009). 
According to the analysis, environmental degradation could raise significant 
health problems and other welfare costs resulted from climate-change. The 
World Bank analyses that the environmental degradation cost will grow at 
the same level of annual growth rate. The analysis also indicates that the 
industries significantly contribute to the severity of the pollution level. 
The Indonesian government has not yet succeeded in reducing the rate of 
environmental damage and the level of pollution. Thus, to prevent a further 
environmental degradation, the government has designed the 
implementation of emission tax (Hasan and Puspitasari, 2008). The role of 
the emission tax has found more ground since the enactment of The 
Environmental Act No 32/2009. This Act is the last amendment of the first 
Environmental Act No. 4/1982 on Environmental Management and 
Protection in Indonesia. The current Act provides the legal basis for the 
government to levy the tax for environmental purposes. The National Action 
Plan Addressing Climate Change of Indonesia (2007) has classified the 
emission tax into carbon tax and environmental tax. While the base for 
environmental tax is the volume of pollutants in general, the carbon tax will 
be based particularly on the volume of emitted carbon-dioxide. 
Abimanyu1 explains that the main objective of environmental tax is to reduce 
the discharge of industrial waste into environment (Kompas, 2008). The 
adoption of environmental tax is crucial considering the increasing level of 
production waste discharging into the rivers, on to the land, and into the air 
in Indonesia. Abimanyu states that the implementation of environmental tax 
could be considered an attempt to raise the responsibility of industries for 
polluting the environment.  
Due to pollution, the availability of clean water in Indonesia tends to 
decrease. Water resources degradation rate is accounted for 15-35% per 
capita annually. Monitoring on 30 main rivers in Indonesia reveals that most 
                                            
1 The Head of Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance of Indonesia. 
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of river water cannot be used for standard water, drinking water, and other 
usage that requires the same water quality (WEPA, 2012). 
Technical details of environmental tax have not been agreed yet. The tax 
had been proposed by the government to be charged at 0.5 %  from  total 
production-cost of polluting firms, however, this proposal had been rejected 
by the  parliament due to strong criticism toward the determination of tax 
base. If the parliament passed the tax proposal, the generated revenue 
would be around 4 trillion IDR or approximately 4.5 billion US$ (Antaranews, 
2007). Despite the failure, the enactment of the tax is considered crucial 
since it can reduce the level of pollution and generate revenue for the 
government. Hilman2 states that the tax-base of environmental tax will be 
more clearly defined (Kontan, 2008). The tax should be based on the 
polluter-pay-principle, where the polluting firms pay the tax proportional to 
their produced pollution.   
The carbon tax is designed to decrease the level of carbon-dioxide emission. 
The vast contribution of carbon-dioxide emission in Indonesia is mainly 
coming from forestry sector, which amounts to 80 % of total GHG emission in 
2007 (PEACE, 2007). However, the emission from fossil-fuel combustion is 
rising rapidly and becoming a significant concern for the future. Emission 
from fossil-fuel combustion is growing at 6% annually, and predicted to 
exceed the emission from forestry sector after 2030 (USAID, 2008).  
According to the Green Paper on Economic and Fiscal Policy Strategies for 
Climate Change Mitigation in Indonesia (2009), the carbon tax will be 
enacted in 2014, started at IDR 80,000.00 (approximately US$ 9) a ton of 
carbon dioxide and rising 5 per cent in real terms annually until 2020. The 
carbon tax will be aimed at the industries that use the combustion of fossil-
fuels. The carbon tax is also targeting other industries that contribute to 
carbon-dioxide emission. For instance, Witoelar3 indentifies the palm oil as 
an industry potentially to be taxed (The Jakarta Globe, 2009). In Indonesia, 
extensive tracts of forest have been converted for oil-palm plantation. This 
land-use conversion along with deforestation is the main sources of carbon-
dioxide emission from forestry sector (USAID, 2008).   
Ministry of Finance (2009) projects the implementation of carbon tax to 
reduce emissions from fossil-fuels combustion by 10% of bussiness-as-ussual 
levels in 2020. The tax is also predicted to generate a tax revenue flow of 
                                            
2 The Deputy for Nature Conservation Enhancement and Environmental Destruction 
Control,  Ministry of Environment of Indonesia. 
3 The Environmental Minister of Indonesia.  
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around 95 trillion IDR annually (approximately 10 billion US$).  This revenue 
can be used to alleviate poverty and improve income distribution in 
Indonesia, to cut other corporate taxes and compensate the industries for 
the losses incurred by the carbon tax, and to support the emission 
abatement (Ministry of Finance and Australia Indonesia Partnership, 2009). 
Crew and parker (ed) (2006) suggest that the implementation of market-
based instruments should also consider nonmarket conditions. These 
conditions include the monitoring and enforcement mechanism, adequacy 
of information, and institutional settings.  In line with the observation of 
Crew and parker (ed) (2006), this study considers several nonmarket issues 
in formulating the emission taxation in Indonesia. 
Firstly, there is a contradiction of interests regarding the implementation of 
tax between the government, represented by Ministry of Finance (MoF), and 
the firms. The MoF is concerned with ensuring tax compliance, enforcing the 
taxpayers to report and pay accurately their tax liability in accordance with 
the applied regulation.  On the other hand, the firms perceive the 
implementation of the tax adding extra expense on their production costs. 
They may incline to decrease the cost by undertaking the actions against the 
compliance with tax regulation.  Due to the high cost of monitoring, the 
compliance behaviour of the firms is not fully observed by the MoF. 
Martowardojo4 mentions that the corporate tax compliance is still low 
(Koran Jakarta, 2011). He points out that only 3.6% of the registered firms in 
Indonesia compliantly file their corporate tax.  Secondly, the complication of 
taxation problem is increased with the presence of bribery in the taxation 
office.  Bribery is alleged to provide a disincentive for tax compliance of 
firms.  The most-recent survey of Bribery Perception Index, conducted by 
Transparency International Indonesia in 2010, reveals that the taxation office 
is still included among the highest bribery-receiving agencies in Indonesia. 
The government of Indonesia has tried to eradicate the systemic corruption 
in public offices by enacting a number of anti corruption laws. For instance, 
the Law No. 31/1999 on the Eradication of  the Criminal Act of Corruption, 
which is amended later by the Law No.20/2001.  Government also involves 
the participation of public in eradicating corruption. In 2000, government 
has issued the Government Regulation No. 71/2000 on the Procedure for 
Implementation of Public Participation and Provision of Appreciation in the 
Prevention and Eradication of the Criminal Act of Corruption. A centralized 
agency to eradicate corruption, which is called the Corruption Eradication 
                                            
4 The Finance Minister of Indonesia 
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Commission, has been established in 2002 to counteract corruption in 
governmental agencies whose functions are related to public services.  
Regarding the corruption eradication in taxation office, the MoF has 
introduced the bureaucratic reform in 2007. The reformation includes the 
increase in officials’ salary, enactment of anti-corruption regulations and 
formation of internal agencies to supervise the performance of officials, and 
implementation of online tax filling system to prevent the potential of 
bribery (Horhoruwet al, 2012). 
Amid those efforts, the corruption in Indonesia (including that in taxation 
office) is still pervasive. The primary challenge of combating corruption is 
that the monitoring mechanisms in Indonesia are mostly under-resourced. 
Supervising governmental agencies still lack of capacity to handle the 
corruption, especially in investigation and surveillance. Other impediment is 
the weak coordination amongst Attorney General’s Office, National Office, 
and Corruption Eradication Commission. This hinders the effective 
prosecution of corruption cases (UNODC, 2012).  
Government has shown intention and efforts to eradicate systemic 
corruption, and certain anti-corruption measures have been attempted by 
MoF to prevent the corruption in taxation office. While the government still 
struggle with the large scale campaign on corruption eradication, the 
attention should also be paid to avert marginal corruption in any specific 
governmental program, including the bribery in the case of emission tax. 
Therefore, it is necessary to embed the anticipation of bribery within the 
emission tax scheme to reduce the potential failure on enforcing the 
compliance.  
Given the necessity of emission tax and the nonmarket conditions expressed 
above, the first objective of this dissertation is to provide the clue regarding 
the optimal emission tax design that induce the compliance under imperfect 
monitoring and the presence of bribery. The optimal emission tax in this 
dissertation is depicted as the outcome of strategic interaction between the 
MoF, tax officials, and the polluting firms.  
There has been a growing literature on environmental policy that 
incorporates the issue of compliance. Bontems and Bourgeon (2005) develop 
a theoretical model of environmental tax where the regulator designing 
environmental policy may monitor the emission level by commencing a 
costly audit. They find that the threat of monitoring may induce the polluters 
to reduce their pollution levels. A similar result is found by Dasgupta et al. 
(2001) and Foulon et al. (2002) in their empirical studies, showing that 
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impact of inspection and threat of inspection are significant in decreasing 
pollution. Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) find that environmental 
tax compliance will increase with the intensity of monitoring.   
Although still rare, the link between corruption and environmental 
compliance at micro level has been examined in the existing literature. For 
instance, Damania (2002) and Wilson and Damania (2005) examine the 
interplay between corruption, environmental policy and environmental 
outcomes. Their theoretical model suggests that the presence of corruption 
worsens the compliance with environmental policy and degrades the 
environmental outcomes.   
Most literature on environmental policy focuses on the role of auditing and 
fines to encourage the compliance, yet the application of financial reward for 
compliance has scarcely been investigated. The need for introducing a 
positive incentive into the tax policy has been mentioned in a few studies 
(Falkinger and Walther, 1991; Swierzbinski, 1994; Feldet al 2006), however, 
empirical evidence of the impact of financial reward on compliances is still 
equally rare. Experimental studies conducted by   Torgler (2003), Bazart and 
Pickhardt (2010), and Kastlunger et al. (2011) are among a few studies to 
demonstrate that compliance is higher with the availability of financial 
reward. 
Existing literature mostly examine the impact of corruption and financial 
reward on compliance in separation, while the combined impact of the 
reward and bribery has not been investigated. This study aims to fill that gap.  
This study is expected to extend the environmental policy and tax 
compliance literature, particularly by examining the role of financial reward 
on emission tax compliance when the bribery is prevalent.  This contribution 
is the second objective of this dissertation. 
The objectives of this dissertation are approached using game theoretical 
and experimental methods. Game theoretical method is a tool to analyse the 
strategic interaction in which the result of a party’s choices depends on the 
decision of others. The approach fits the approach of this study, which is 
focusing on the problem of strategic interaction between different parties 
that act rationally and take into account other’s choices before formulating 
their strategies. The common critic on this approach is that the method 
relies heavily on the assumption that the economic agents are fully rational 
and driven solely by the motivation to maximize their benefit. The 
experimental approach could relax the assumption of rationality, allowing 
the possibility that economic agents do not necessarily take decisions based 
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on a logical consideration. This approach could fill the gap between the 
actual economic behaviour and the prediction of the theoretical model. Both 
game theory and experimental approaches are useful to investigate a policy 
design when the required empirical data are limited, or even unavailable. 
These approaches are particularly important to predict the performance of 
new policies prior to their instalment, where the relevant empirical data 
have not been established.  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the theoretical and experimental 
research to formulate the emission tax scheme has never been conducted in 
Indonesia.  This study is important for policy purpose, since tax compliance is 
worst within the corrupt administration in many middle-income countries 
such as Indonesia (Purohit, 2007). Therefore, more attention should be paid 
on finding alternative policy mixture to improve that situation. Inspired by 
the case of Indonesia, this study might also provide the insight for other 
developing countries that share the similar institutional setting. 
This dissertation is structured as follows. After this introduction chapter, the 
second chapter describes the problem of taxation and the prospect of 
emission tax in Indonesia. The description lays the foundation to construct 
the theoretical model and experimental design in the following chapters.  
The third chapter presents the theoretical model formulating the optimal 
emission tax schemes to induce compliance. The fourth chapter provides the 
experimental results of the impacts of emission tax design on compliance 
behaviour. The last chapter concludes the whole findings of this dissertation.  
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Chapter 2 
INSIGHT FROM IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW:                                                                                              
TAX NONCOMPLIANCE, BRIBERY, AND THE PROSPECT OF EMISSION TAX  IN 
INDONESIA 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The main objectives of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) are to manage the 
state budget and to safeguard the state revenue by means of tax collection.  
Consequently, tax compliance is a topic of great interest to the MoF.  Tax 
compliance is defined as the willingness of a taxpayer to report and pay 
accurately their tax liability according to regulation (Rothet al, 1989). The 
MoF is also concerned with ensuring a good performance of tax officials 
during tax collection and preventing any leakage of tax revenue due to 
officials’ corruption. Corruption can be defined as the utilization of public 
office for private gain, including utilization of public office to take advantage 
of those who are dealing with the government through bribery (Wilson and 
Damania, 2005).  
The achievement of those objectives may be impeded by several factors. 
Firstly, tax collection will obviously increase the cost of the firms, and 
rational firms may learn that the cost can be lessened by decreasing their tax 
compliance.  Secondly, the tax officials may be motivated by the 
maximization of personal benefit. This pursuit of personal benefit can trigger 
dysfunctional attitudes of the officials, which leads to the leakage of tax 
revenue. 
Attempting to investigate those taxation problems, the objective of this 
chapter can be derived into more specific directions; to look into the issue of 
tax noncompliance and to observe bribery practice among tax officials in 
Indonesia.  Existing literature on tax compliance and corruption consider 
these subjects to be directly related to the problem of monitoring 
mechanism. Therefore, this study also aims to explore the adequacy of 
supervision on tax compliance and the sufficiency of inspection mechanism 
on corrupting behaviour among tax officials in Indonesia.  The inability of 
these mechanisms to observe the performance of firms and tax officials 
indicates the presence of asymmetric information. Asymmetric information 
can lead to a hidden action problem, a situation in which the firms and tax 
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officials may act in an unknown way to the MoF and contradict the MoF’s 
objectives. 
Another objective of this chapter is to provide a description regarding the 
adoption of emission tax in Indonesia. Emission tax is described as a tax 
levied on the physical unit, or the substitute of it, which has a negative effect 
on the environment (Fullerton et al., 2008). The revenue of emission tax 
could be allocated to improve the environmental quality or directed toward 
non environmental welfare. The National Action Plan Addressing Climate 
Change of Indonesia (2007) mentions the emission tax as one of the fiscal 
instruments to support government’s environmental programs. According to 
the Action Plan, the emission tax includes the environmental tax and the 
carbon tax.  The base for the environmental tax imposition is the volume of 
pollutants in general, while the carbon tax is charged specifically on the 
volume of emitted carbon dioxide. This research seeks to provide the hint 
regarding the prospect of emission tax in Indonesia, especially on the 
necessity of the tax and its acceptability from the side of the firms. 
The data are obtained through in-depth interviews with the key informants. 
The in-depth interview approach is used to elicit information and to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of the interviewee’s position. It also enables 
the exploration of compelling issues for further investigation. 
The following section provides a brief review on the legal basis for emission 
tax and the taxation system to provide the insight regarding how the system 
works in Indonesia. The next section describes the problem of taxation and 
the prospect of emission tax in Indonesia, and explains the method through 
which these information are obtained. The main findings of this chapter are 
summarized in the last section. 
 
2.2. REVIEW OF THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT   
The Environmental Act No. 39/2009 on Basic Stipulations on Environmental 
Management, which is replacing the Act No. 4/1982 and the Act No. 23 
/1997, states that the objectives of the environmental management are to 
establish the sustainable development by regulating the use of the 
environment, to prevent environmental damage, and to mitigate the 
degradation of environmental quality caused by pollution. The Act defines 
the pollution as the infiltration of substances or elements into the 
environment that degrades the quality of environment, leading to a failure of 
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environmental functions. The Act No. 32/2009 explicitly states that one of the 
standards for the environmental management in Indonesia is the Polluter 
Pay Principle. It is further explained in the Act that all parties responsible for 
inflicting the pollution are compelled to provide compensation for the 
negative consequences suffered by the environment. 
The Environmental Act in Indonesia has provided a variety of legal 
instruments to prevent environmental degradation. These legal instruments 
are covering the administrative, civil, criminal, and fiscal law.  Administrative 
law consists of environmental use arrangement, environmental audit, and 
administrative sanction. Civil law focuses on repairing environmental 
damage and environmental restoration.  Criminal law concerns with 
environmental crime and the application of sanction. Fiscal law addresses 
the imposition of environmental tax/levies on the responsible parties for 
activities that affect the environmental quality. 
The Environmental Act No. 39/2009 includes tax as a fiscal instrument of 
environmental management.  The tax has two functions. Firstly, the 
budgetary function where the taxes are expected to generate more revenue 
for the government. Secondly, the regulatory function where the taxes serve 
to regulate the economic activities that discharge the emission, to prevent 
pollution and environmental degradation, and to provide compensation for 
people who are victimized by environmental damage. The tax is aimed at the 
polluters, and the tax payment should be based on the volume of their 
taxable pollutants. 
The Environmental Acts in Indonesia also provide the legal basis of the 
monitoring mechanism to ensure the compliance of economic agents on 
environmental regulation. According to the Acts, the appointed 
governmental agencies have the power to supervise the compliance of the 
parties responsible for any activity with applicable environmental regulation, 
to order an environmental audit when the violation against regulation is 
suspected, and to conduct an investigation for environmental crime. 
The taxation in Indonesia is consigned under the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF). The MoF has the control on taxation, including 
the issuance of taxation laws and regulations, collection of taxes, and 
enforcement of compliance with the taxes obligation. 
According to Taxation Law No. 6/1983, which has been modified lastly by Law 
No. 28/2007, the taxation in Indonesia applies the self-assessment system.  
This system provides the taxpayers with full responsibility to calculate, 
report, and pay their tax obligation. In this system, the functions of tax 
 11 
 
officials are limited to delivering information regarding taxation procedures 
and regulations, provide administrative service, and monitor the compliance 
of taxpayers through tax inspection. 
Nasution, the Director of the Taxation Office, explains that monitoring on the 
taxpayers’ compliance in Indonesia applies the profiling and benchmarking 
mechanism (Suara Merdeka, 2009). Profiling refers to the activity of 
developing database, covering the income and the taxes payment of the 
taxpayers. The database will enable the tax office to establish a benchmark 
that can be used further as a standard in measuring the degree of tax 
compliance and an early indication of noncompliance. The benchmark is 
determined by comparing the volume of tax payments among taxpayers in 
the same cluster of income. Benchmarking could provide direction for 
further tax inspection, to examine the suspected tax evasion. 
Finance Minister Decree No. 199/2007 defines inspection as the series of 
collecting and processing information or evidence, conducted objectively 
and professional according to inspection standards, in order to examine the 
compliance of taxpayers in fulfilling their tax obligations. The inspection can 
be categorized into field inspection and office inspection. The field 
inspection means that the inspection is conducted in the taxpayers’ place, 
while office inspection refers to an inspection conducted in the office of tax 
officials. Inspection is undertaken by tax officials or, if necessary, experts 
appointed by the taxation office. The noncompliance behaviour of taxpayers 
includes the failure to submit the tax report, submitting the inaccurate tax 
report, and refusal to pay the tax obligation. In the case that noncompliance 
is found during the inspection, the taxpayers will be charged with a sanction. 
Finance Minister Decree No. 33/2007 describes that the tax officials should 
comply with the ethical code of the MoF. According to the ethical code, tax 
officials have the obligation to work with professionalism, transparency, and 
accountability.  Tax officials are expected to provide optimal service to 
taxpayers. This regulation also explicitly states that tax officials are 
prohibited to misuse their authority directly or indirectly for personal 
benefit, and prohibited accepting  any forms of gift (from taxpayers and 
other parties) which is suspected to induce their integrity. Tax officials who 
violate the ethical code will be charged with administrative sanction and 
demanded to return the loss of tax revenue due to their action. 
Monitoring on the performance and behaviour of the MoF’s officials is 
directed by Inspectorate General of Ministry of Finance. According to the 
Finance Minister Decree No. 143.1/2009, Inspectorate General has the 
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mandate to enforce the task accomplishment of the officials in accordance 
with the laws and regulations. In order to carry out the mandate, 
Inspectorate General is authorized to formulate the supervision policies, to 
implement the performance monitoring and budget control, and to support 
the eradication of corruption within the MoF.  The supervision of 
Inspectorate General is aimed to encourage the internal compliance with 
laws and regulations within the MoF, to oversee the dysfunctional behaviour 
of MoF’s officials through surveillance and investigation, and to promote the 
clean government within the ranks of the MoF. 
Directorate General of Taxation, one of Directorates General within Ministry 
of Finance, also has an internal unit with similar functions as Inspectorate 
General.   This unit is called Directorate of Internal Compliance and Human 
Resources Transformation (Kepatuhan Internal dan Transformasi Sumber 
Daya Manusia/KITSDA). KITSDA is mandated to monitor the performance 
and the compliance of officials within the taxation office.  While Inspectorate 
General is dealing with the performance of the MoF’s employees in general, 
the responsibility of KITSDA is limited only to supervise the officials of the 
taxation office. Finance Minister Decree No. 184/2010 states that KITSDA is 
established to formulate and execute the enforcement policy on the 
compliance of tax officials. The main functions of KITSDA, according to the 
Decree, are preparing the practicable standards of compliance and 
performing the inspection to examine the compliance of tax officials. 
 
2.3. RESEARCH METHOD  
This study uses the in-depth interview, a technique that includes intensive 
individual interviews with a few respondents to elaborate their perspectives 
on a particular issue or situation. In-depth interview is useful for the 
research intended to explore certain issues in-depth, providing a more 
comprehensive picture regarding a specific issue of interest. 
The interview is designed to be semi-structured. A semi-structured interview 
is categorized into the guided interview where general questions are asked, 
and additional questions are allowed to arise spontaneously during the 
interview as a result of the discussion. The approach combines a 
predetermined series of open questions to stimulate discussion with the 
spontaneous enquiries to elaborate further specific topics or responses that 
arise during the interview (Punch, 2008). Different to a structured interview 
with standardized and limited set questions; semi-structured interview does 
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not restrict respondents to a set of predetermined answers. In fact, semi-
structured interview is classified as guided only in the sense that some forms 
of the interview have been prepared earlier to provide the outline for the 
conversation. 
As has been described in the introduction, the study is intended to elaborate 
the problems of corporate taxation and to provide the hint regarding the 
adoption of emission tax in Indonesia. The taxation problems could be 
specified further into violations against tax compliance and the presence of 
bribery. The topics of inquiry to probe the taxations problem are the tax 
compliance issue, monitoring mechanism on tax compliance, the issue of tax 
officials’ corrupt behaviour, and the monitoring mechanism to ensure the 
compliance of tax officials with the standards and ethical codes. Concerning 
the prospect of emission tax implementation in Indonesia, the interviews 
focus on elaborating the perception of respondents on the necessity of 
emission tax and the acceptability of the tax implementation by the business 
community. 
The respondents are selected from various agencies, representing different 
stakeholders in taxation, to enable the elaboration of the situations from 
different perspectives.  Those agencies are the Tax Audit and Investigation 
Office (Kantor Pemeriksaan dan Penyidikan Pajak/KPPP), the Directorate of 
Internal Compliance and Human Resource Transformation (Direktorat 
Kepatuhan Internal dan Transformasi Sumber Daya Manusia/KITSDA), the 
Indonesian Employers Association (Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia/APINDO), 
the Fiscal Policy Office (Badan Koordinasi Fiskal/BKF) and Indonesia 
Corruption Watch (ICW). To provide the inside-views on the problem of 
taxation, this study also adds tax officials in the list of respondents.  
The selected agencies have different concerns. The priority of the KPPP is to 
ensure the compliance of taxpayers. KITSDA is concerned with the 
compliance of tax officials to the standards and ethical code. APINDO is 
representing the interests of firms when dealing with government policy and 
other circumstances crucial for their business activities.  Relevant with the 
objective of the organization to support the creation of a clean government, 
ICW focuses on watching the corrupt behaviour in the governmental 
agencies.  Tax advisors from the tax consultant agency are involved in 
providing more elaborated descriptions on the real practice of taxation. 
The experts from the university with relevant academic expertise are 
included as the respondents of in-depth interview.  The inclusion of those 
experts is expected to give a more general and neutral assessment on the 
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taxation from the academic view.  The experts are not only selected on the 
basis of their academic expertise, but also their professional interaction with 
the business community and bureaucracy. Therefore, the interviewed 
experts are not only able to offer theoretical and normative opinions, but 
also to provide the practical explanations. 
The interviews took place in the offices of the respondents during working 
hours. The interview was started with an introduction, during which the 
interviewer explained the context of the study and the objectives of the 
interview. Afterwards, the interview carried on by following the prepared 
short list of open questions and probing the answers of respondents with 
related inquiries. The guiding questions were designed comprehensibly to 
stimulate more elaborating responses from the respondents.  
The interviews were conducted in September 2009 in Indonesia.  During the 
interviews, the conversations were recorded, after having the permission 
from the interviewees.  The small notes were taken to complement the 
record and to emphasize the intriguing points expresses by the respondent 
for further elaboration. However, the interview with tax officials was not 
following the same procedures. They insisted that their names would not be 
revealed and they refused to be recorded. The interview was not able to 
elaborate information in-depth, since they acted cautiously.  
 
2.4. THE FINDINGS  
This section presents the main findings from the interviews. The information 
obtained from the respondents is grouped according to the main issues that 
are intended to assess in the interview. Since the respondents come from 
various backgrounds and competencies, the emphasizing of elaborated 
issues during the interview are different from one to the other. The overview 
of the results is presented in the following table. 
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Table 2.1 
Overview of interview results 
 
Key Response to: 
No. Interviewee 
Incident of Tax 
Noncompliance 
and Monitoring 
Mechanism 
Practice of 
Bribery and 
Monitoring 
Mechanism of Tax 
Officials 
Prospect of 
Emission tax in 
Indonesia 
 
1 APINDO  Tax 
noncompliance 
 Bribery practice  Necessity of 
emission tax  
 Firms’ lack of 
awareness 
 Potential low 
acceptance 
2 Tax Advisor  Tax 
noncompliance 
 Imperfect 
monitoring 
 Bribery practice  Firms’ lack of 
awareness 
 Potential low 
acceptance 
3 KPPP  Tax 
noncompliance 
 Imperfect 
monitoring 
 Bribery practice 
 Imperfect 
monitoring 
 
4 KITSDA  Tax 
noncompliance 
 Bribery practice 
 Imperfect 
monitoring 
 
5 ICW   Bribery practice 
 Imperfect 
monitoring 
 
6 BKF  Tax 
noncompliance 
 Bribery practice  Necessity of 
emission tax 
 Potential low 
acceptance 
 
 
7 Environmental 
Economics’Expert 
   Necessity of 
emission tax 
 Firms’ lack of 
awareness 
 Potential low 
acceptance 
 
8 Public 
Economics’ 
Expert 1 
 Tax 
noncompliance 
 Imperfect 
 Bribery practice 
 Imperfect 
monitoring 
 Necessity of 
emission tax 
 Firms’ lack of 
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monitoring awareness 
 
 
9 Public 
Economics’ 
Expert 2 
 Tax 
noncompliance 
 Imperfect 
monitoring 
 Bribery practice 
 Imperfect 
monitoring 
 
10 Industrial 
Economics’ 
Expert 
 Tax 
noncompliance 
 Bribery practice  Necessity of 
emission tax 
 Potential low 
acceptance 
11 Tax Officials  Tax 
noncompliance 
 Imperfect 
monitoring 
 Bribery practice 
 Rogorous 
monitoring  
 
Note: The bullets indicate the issues whose presence is confirmed by the interviewees.  
 
2.4.1. The Incident of Tax Noncompliance and Monitoring Mechanism in 
Indonesia 
Almost all respondents agreed that noncompliance behaviour on tax 
payment was still present in Indonesia. The interviewee from KPPP stated 
that tax compliance in Indonesia was still lower than that of other Asian 
countries. Although the accurate data was hard to assess, he believed that 
there were still a lot of firms understating their tax liability. He also 
mentioned the necessity of changing the paradigm of imposing the 
compliance. Instead of the enforcement by punishment, he suggested to try 
enhancing the compliance with more positive incentives, such as providing a 
better service in tax administration and offering a financial reward for 
compliant taxpayers. 
Two anonymous tax officials stated that most of firms were trying to hide 
their true income, and the task of tax officials was to audit the accuracy of 
the tax reports. The audit process was laborious and time-consuming. 
Although the audit could not be directed toward the entire submitted 
reports, however, most audits were able to verify the truthfulness of the 
assessed reports.  
The interviewee from KITSDA stated that the unwillingness to pay the tax 
(which he believed as the basic characteristic of the firms) was the main 
motivation of tax evasion. The interviewed expert of Industrial Economics 
also agreed that the level of tax compliance was low. Tax payment was costly 
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for the firms, and the firms tried to decrease the cost by evading the tax.  
Based on his discussion with the firms and tax consultants, he explained that 
tax noncompliance was mostly conducted through accounting manipulation 
of financial records. The firms still filled their tax reports, but the report had 
been understated and the declared value of the taxable objects was lower 
than the actual amount. 
He mentioned three rationales to justify the noncompliance behaviour of the 
firms. The first reason was relating with the transparency of tax revenue 
utilization.  The firms were not well informed about the purpose and the 
allocation of the tax revenue. The second reason was concerning the trust of 
firms on the credibility of the government in managing the tax revenue. The 
firms were not convinced that the tax revenue would be allocated solely for 
public facility and services without leakage due to corruption within the 
bureaucracy. The third reason was more pragmatic; the firms perceived that 
the facility brought to them by the government was still insignificant. These 
reasons discouraged the firms from paying the tax accurately and compelled 
them to reduce their tax reports. 
The interviewee from APINDO stated that the firms had no intentions to 
evade the taxes. However, he stated that the rate and variety of corporate 
taxes in Indonesia were burdening. The taxes were not well organized and 
the procedures were complicated. Therefore, the incidents of 
noncompliance might arise due to the firms’ unawareness of tax regulations. 
He added that the perception on the corruptibility of tax officials could not 
be omitted entirely, although the government had tried to improve the 
integrity of the taxation office. That conviction discouraged the firms to 
comply with the tax regulations.  He argued that the taxpayers, including the 
firms, had contributed to the economic development in Indonesia. 
Therefore, he claimed that the firms deserved better services and rewards 
from the government. 
The interviewed tax advisor described that the main practice of tax 
noncompliance was understating the tax report, where the firms reported 
their tax liability lower than the actual value.  He stated that tax reporting 
was like a gambling game for the firms.  Due to the fact that taxation in 
Indonesia adopts a self-assessment system, firms could purposely understate 
the tax report and played with the probability of being audited. They 
expected to get a gain in the absence of tax auditing, and were prepared to 
accept the sanction once the audit was commenced. 
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He added that interpretation of regulations could also affect the compliance 
behaviour of the firms. Tax noncompliance was not only driven by the firms’ 
gain seeking behaviour, but might also be caused by the difference in 
interpreting the regulations.  When a disagreement regarding the 
interpretation of tax liability arouse between firms and tax officials, the 
Directorate of Taxation would handle the dispute, and the firms were usually 
deemed noncompliant. This imbalance in power, where the Directorate of 
Taxation had the authority to interpret as well as to implement the 
regulation, also contributed to the degradation of motivation to comply.   
The firms perceived that their effort to comply with the procedures was 
futile, since they would be sanctioned eventually for unanticipated reasons. 
The interviewee from BKF stated that the current incident of tax 
noncompliance was lower due to the improvement of tax filling procedures. 
This statement was supported by the interviewed expert of Public 
Economics. However, he argued that the manipulation of tax report was still 
a common practice in Indonesia. He believed that the potential of tax 
manipulation would persist so long as the tax system allowed the taxpayers 
to assess and report their tax liability independently.  The other interviewed 
researcher and expert in Public Economics also agreed that the tax 
noncompliance could not be omitted completely, since the probability of 
being inspected was low and the expected benefit of noncompliance was 
relatively higher than the sanction.  
Most respondents agreed on the flaw of monitoring mechanism on tax 
compliance, which could not expose the entire incidents of evasion. The 
interviewee from KPPP stated that examining the accuracy of the tax report 
was difficult. It was impossible to check the accuracy of all reports due to the 
limitation of human resources and budget availability. He added that a 
robust monitoring system should be supported by a good availability of data. 
Currently, the micro data of firms’ performance is still lacking. Developing 
database of the firms could be the best way to provide for accurate 
examination of the tax report. However, obtaining the comprehensive 
information from individual firm was costly.  The feasible alternatives were 
profiling and benchmarking. Profiling referred to the activity of developing 
the data of the firms, which would be the basis for benchmarking. 
Benchmarking was operationalized through finding the average figure of 
taxable income from the same cluster of the firms, and using this 
information as a benchmark to assess the acceptability of the reports.  These 
processes were expected to provide preliminary indicators of suspected tax 
evasion, which could be followed up with the audit. 
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The interviewed tax advisor explained that it was extremely difficult to 
examine all submitted reports due to the shortcoming of tax office 
personnel. In the current tax practice in Indonesia, the priority of tax 
auditing was given to verify the claim of tax extra-payment return proposed 
by the firms.  He concluded that it was impossible to check the accuracy of 
all tax reports. Therefore, the chance of moral hazard by understating the tax 
report was widely open. The interviewed Public Economics expert agreed 
that monitoring the tax compliance was difficult and costly. In his opinion, 
the best practice of monitoring should be the implementation of online 
transaction recording in which all the transactions of the firms went through 
the Directorate of Taxation database.  However, this system was not 
currently feasible in Indonesia.  The other Public Economics expert also 
indicated that monitoring mechanism to ensure the compliance of firms was 
costly. Furthermore, the sanction imposed to noncompliant firms was low. 
2.4.2. The Practice of Bribery and Monitoring Mechanism of Tax Officials 
The interviewee from KPPP explained that the practice of bribery in the 
taxation office was decreasing after the tax reformation in 2007. The tax 
reformation included the increase in tax officials’ salaries and the instalment 
of the tax online system. The online system enabled the firms to submit their 
tax report online, and restricted the face-to-face interaction between the 
firms and the tax officials. However, he also admitted that incidents of 
bribery could not be eliminated since tax auditing still required firms and tax 
officials to meet, and bribery usually occurred during this process. 
He added that another problem arose after tax reformation. Tax reformation 
decreased the chance of corruption, however, this was not always beneficial 
for the tax revenue generation. Previously the corruption level was higher, 
but it was compensated by the persistent effort of tax officials to audit the 
tax reports.  The officials intensively checked the accuracy of the reports, 
because they expected to extract a bribe from the cheating firms. On the 
other hand, the government was also better off since the total amount of 
collected tax revenue was higher, although there was a leakage due to 
bribery. However, tax officials’ efforts to audit the tax were not as laborious 
after the reformation, since the chance of getting the bribe was more 
restricted. Therefore, he suggested that the tax officials were provided with 
the additional financial incentive, which was based on their performance on 
collecting and auditing the tax. 
The interviewee from APINDO stated that tax officials were relatively cleaner 
now, but the presence of bribery had not been omitted entirely. He 
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explained that it was still a common practice for tax officials to extract the 
bribe by manipulating the firms’ unawareness of tax regulation.  According 
to his opinion, it was the task of tax officials to guide and to teach the firms 
about the tax regulations. However, instead of providing the assistance, tax 
officials deliberately let the firms made mistakes during the tax assessment.  
When the tax officials and the firms met during an auditing process, the 
officials showed the error of tax calculation and treated to charge heavy 
sanction on the firms.  Tax negotiations would take place afterwards, where 
the tax officials offered the reduction of sanction if the firms agreed to 
provide the bribe. 
The interviewed tax advisor stated that the imbalance of power between tax 
officials and firms could lead to bribe extraction, in which the tax officials 
forced the firms to provide a bribe by threatening them with heavy sanction 
due to their failure to comply with regulations.  The extraction could be 
initiated with the difference of interpreting the tax regulations between 
firms and tax officials. The firms often believed that they had obeyed the 
regulation, while tax officials concluded the opposite. In this case, bribery 
became a way to escape the unanticipated sanction. 
The interviewee from BKF stated that the possibility of bribery in taxation 
still existed. However, he believed that the incident of tax collusion had 
decreased since the implementation of online tax filing system. This new 
installed system restricted the meetings between the tax officials and the 
firms thus decreased the potential of tax negotiations between those two 
parties.   
Two anonymous tax officials agreed that the bribery between tax officials 
and the firms might happen. The cheating firms tried to lessen the tax 
payment by approaching the officials and offering the bribe. However, they 
argued correspondingly that this bribery incident could not indicate the 
behaviour of tax officials in general.  One of them further added that the 
internal supervision mechanism within Taxation Office was more rigorous 
after the bureaucratic reform introduced by MoF in 2007. It alerted the 
officials to be more compliant with ethical-codes since any indisciplinary 
actions were subject to sanctions.   
The interviewee from ICW admitted that the MoF had initiated an internal 
reformation to eradicate the corruption; however, he believed that the 
mentality of tax officials hardly changed. The reformation was mainly 
conducted at the policy level, yet still a lot of chances for bribery at the 
operational level. He mentioned that the bribery mainly occurred during the 
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auditing process, where the officials met the firms to examine the accuracy 
of the tax reports. Since the interaction between tax officials and the firms 
could not be avoided, he argued that the bribery within Taxation Office was 
still a common practice in Indonesia. He also believed that the corruption 
within Taxation Office was a systemic instead of a personal behaviour. He 
quoted the statement from one tax official, that junior tax officials were 
advised to extract the bribe from the audited firms and share the earnings 
with their superiors.  
The pervasive bribery in taxation practice was also recognized by the 
interviewed expert of Industrial Economics. He stated that bribery was an 
ordinary practice in Indonesia. This practice was difficult to eliminate since it 
was beneficial for both taxpayers and tax officials. He also indicated that tax 
officials might take advantage of taxpayers’ lack of knowledge regarding the 
regulation to extract the bribe. Once the calculation of tax liability between 
tax officials and the reporting firms differed, the tax officials usually asked for 
bribe to release the firms from the punishment for noncompliance.  The two 
interviewed experts of Public Economics supported the statement that the 
bribery still existed in taxation case and the monitoring mechanism to 
prevent the bribery was still ineffective.  
The interviewee from KPPP recognized the existence of internal monitoring 
mechanism within the General Directorate of Taxation to combat the 
corruption, however, he considered the appointed department   (KITSDA) 
unable to observe the behaviour of all officials. The interviewee from ICW 
also shared the same opinion that KITSDA could not totally prevent the 
practice of corruption due to the limited number of personnel. 
The interviewee from KITSDA stated that his department was authorized to 
monitor and to inspect the compliance of tax officials with the regulations 
and the code of ethics.  The inspection was mainly conducted after receiving 
a complaint regarding the attitude of tax officials. He acknowledged that the 
availability of personnel within his department was still lacking. This 
limitation impeded the performance of his department to prevent the 
corrupt behaviour of tax officials.  He added that the same condition was 
also applied to the General Inspectorate of Ministry of Finance. The 
inspectorate main responsibility was to ensure the compliance of the 
Ministry of Finance employees with the regulations and code of ethics. 
Nevertheless, the General Inspectorate could not fully examine the 
behaviour of employees of the MoF due to the similar problem of resources 
deficiency. 
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2.4.3. The Prospect of Emission tax in Indonesia 
The interviewed expert in Environmental Economics stated that the 
environmental problem was not the main priority of the government in 
Indonesia.  The government still focused on the conventional development 
issues such as of poverty, income inequality, and unemployment problems. 
Consequently, the national budget allocated to environmental purposes was 
still insufficient.  Although she admitted that the government of Indonesia 
had shown a concern toward environmental problems by announcing 
various environmental regulations, the effectiveness of those regulations 
environmental management in Indonesia was still deficient.  She argued that 
this ineffectiveness could stem from two reasons, the low compliance of the 
polluting firms toward regulations and the inadequacy of enforcement 
efforts by the government. The regulated economic agents were often 
averse to complying with the regulations that would incur extra cost.    In 
Indonesia, the enforcement efforts were insufficient since the available 
resources allocated on environmental management were inadequate. 
She argued that the environmental situation in Indonesia was not well 
managed due to the lack of common understanding among all stakeholders 
such as the government, society, and the firms regarding the issue of the 
environment. She stated that the emission tax were necessary in Indonesia. 
However, she added that the success of the tax implementation was 
questionable since the awareness of environmental problems was still 
lacking. 
She also stated that taxation in Indonesia, in general, was still lacking 
transparency. For instance, environmental tax should be collected by the 
government to discourage environmentally harmful activities, and the tax 
revenue should be directed to repair the environmental degradation due to 
the residual of the production process. However, the collected tax revenues 
were pooled together, and the allocation of tax revenues was not separable, 
despite the source of the taxes. 
The interviewed expert of Public Economics emphasized the importance of 
defining the main objectives of emission tax in Indonesia.  He stated that 
there were two objectives of emission tax; to generate the tax revenue 
(budgetary function) and to control the emission (regulatory function). The 
emission tax should be able to synergize those two functions, in the sense 
that the tax was not only aimed at increasing the government revenue but 
more importantly to put a limit on polluting emission. He argued that the 
source of emission should be identified first, then the tax should be levied 
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selectively only on the firms that emit the pollutants. The tax should be 
based on the generated emission; so that the polluting firms that emit more 
pollutants paid higher emission tax. 
Concerning the prospect of emission tax implementation, he stated that the 
government could impose the tax although the awareness of the firms on 
environmental issues was still deficient. The adoption of emission tax would 
provide the firms with two choices regarding their polluting behaviour.   The 
first choice was abating their emission, while the second choice was paying 
the tax proportional to the generated emission and allowing the government 
to use the collected tax revenue to finance public abatement. The 
government should ensure that the accrued tax would be allocated to 
mitigate the negative impact of emission on environmental quality. He 
provided the illustration of a water pollution case. Currently the polluting 
firms with insufficient technology to decontaminate the production waste 
simply discard the waste into the river.  If the government taxed the firms for 
discharging the pollutants, the collected revenue of emission tax could be 
used to build the liquid waste distillation tanks for the polluting firms in the 
same area. He further argued that technically measuring the emission as the 
base of tax would not be a problem since the required technology was 
applicable in Indonesia.   
The interviewed tax advisor and the interviewee from KPPP admitted that 
there was a lack of interest on the issue of environmental degradation on the 
firms’ side. However, interviewee from KPPP acceded that firms generating 
harmful pollutants should be taxed.  They agreed on one point that the firms 
would be reluctant to be charged with an additional tax, since currently 
there had been various corporate taxes in Indonesia.  The interviewed expert 
of Industrial Economics also warned that the emission tax, although 
theoretically necessary, would become a burden for the firms and potentially 
lead to evasion. 
The interviewee from BKF focused on the plan of carbon tax, the other type 
of emission tax apart from environmental tax.  The carbon tax would be 
levied on the carbon generating firms according to the volume of emitted 
carbon, or other materials that could be the proxies for the emitted carbon 
(such as the volume of the required energy for the production process). In 
order to prove the accuracy of the reported emission, the tax office could 
use the service of the third parties (environmental consultants) to audit the 
emission. Although it was possible that the environmental consultants and 
the tax officials were agreed to take a bribe from the firms to allow the 
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manipulation of the reported emission, he assumed that most of them 
would try to keep their integrity.   He mentioned that carbon tax on fossil 
fuels for household consumption, mainly gasoline for automobiles, was also 
considered. However, he commented that a more suitable policy on gasoline 
consumption for automobiles was a subsidy reduction (since gasoline was 
heavily subsidized in Indonesia) instead of imposing the tax on gasoline use. 
He also added that the implementation of carbon tax should be carefully 
designed, since there were many corporate taxes levied by the regional 
government and additional tax would be an extra burden for the firms. 
 
2.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter is intended to describe the problems of taxation in Indonesia 
and to provide a hint regarding the implementation of emission tax. The 
taxation problems are originated from the conflicting objective between the 
MoF, firms, and tax officials and the asymmetric information.  The conflicting 
objectives lead to the tax noncompliance and bribery practice, while the 
problem of asymmetric information results in the inability of the monitoring 
mechanism to observe the tax compliance of firms and to examine the 
performance of tax officials.  
In-depth interview reveals that all respondents agree on the persistence of 
tax noncompliance. The main practice of tax noncompliance is understating 
the tax liability. Firms submit an inaccurate tax report, of which the declared 
tax liability has been undervalued. The interview reveals various reasons 
behind the firms’ noncompliance behaviour.  The first reason is that the tax 
payment is costly for the firms. Furthermore, there are various corporate 
taxes in Indonesia that should be obliged by the firms. The heavy taxes 
burden contributes to the reluctance of the firms to pay the tax accurately.  
The second reason is the lack of transparency in tax revenue utilization, so 
that firms are unaware about the allocation of the collected tax by the 
government. The third reason is the issue of trust, firms are dubious that tax 
revenue will be allocated solely for public facilities and services without 
leakage due to corruption within the bureaucracy. The fourth reason is the 
perception of firms that the received services and facilities, in return for tax 
payments, are still insufficient. The fifth reason is the firms’ unawareness of 
tax regulations and procedures.  The firms have the intention to pay the tax 
correctly; however, they are deemed noncompliant either because they do 
not comprehend the regulations or have a different interpretation of the 
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regulations. The last reason revealed during the interview is the low 
monitoring and sanctioning rate. Provided that the probability of being 
inspected is low and the benefit of noncompliance is relatively higher than 
the sanction, the practice of tax noncompliance will persist. 
The main practice of corruption within tax officials is bribery, where firms 
and tax officials collude to negotiate tax or a sanction reduction in exchange 
for bribes.  The interview results indicate that although the practice of 
bribery is decreasing, the practice cannot be completely omitted.  It is also 
revealed that tax officials may take advantage of firms’ unawareness of tax 
regulations to extract a bribe. Tax officials threaten the firms with a heavy 
sanction (if they are deemed noncompliant), and the firms are forced to pay 
the bribes. Bribe extraction could happen partly due to the imbalance of 
power between tax officials and firms. The taxation office has the authority 
to interpret the tax regulations. In the case when differing opinions occur 
regarding the interpretation of the regulations, the interpretation from the 
officials will be referred to.  
Within the structure of the Ministry of Finance, there are two units 
responsible for monitoring the compliance of tax officials with the 
regulations and preventing the violation of the code of ethics. The first unit is 
the Inspectorate General of Ministry of Finance, and the second is the 
Directorate of Internal Compliance and Human Resources Transformation. 
These units have the authority to conduct the inspection of officials’ 
compliance with regulations and investigate the suspicion of authority 
misuse. The Inspectorate General of Ministry of Finance is responsible to 
ensure the compliance of all the employees within the Ministry of Finance, 
while the responsibility for the other unit is limited only on establishing the 
compliance within the Directorate of Taxation.  However, the interviews' 
results indicate that those units are unable to monitor the performance of 
tax officials and prevent the occurrence of bribery practice, due to the 
inadequacy of available resources and systemic characteristic of bribery. 
Inferring from the in-depth interview results, the implementation of 
emission tax is necessary to reduce environmental degradation. The 
emission tax should not only aim at increasing the government revenue but 
more importantly to put a limit on the polluting emission. Interviewed 
experts state that ideally the revenue from emission tax should be targeted 
to correct the negative impact of the emission. This statement appears to 
contradict the double-dividend hypothesis of emission tax.  Emission tax has 
two functions according to the standard environmental economics literature. 
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The first function of environmental tax is to regulate the pollution and, thus, 
improve the environmental quality.  The second function is to generate 
revenue for the government, and the proceeds can be allocated to produce 
public goods. The government can reduce other distortionary taxes, and 
thereby create an economic gain, due to this revenue generation ability. This 
process is defined as revenue-recycling effect. These two functions of 
environmental tax can lead to the final outcomes referred to as the double-
dividend, where the society receives both the improvement of 
environmental quality and the revenue-recycling (Hackett, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the statement that emission tax revenue should be directed 
on public abatement reflects the urgency of the government’s concerns on 
the environmental issue in Indonesia, where the allocation of the national 
budget does not appear to prioritize the environmental problem while the 
environmental degradation is constantly increasing. According to Kambuaya 
(2011), the budget allocated for environmental purpose amid the 
widespread environmental problems is still inferior to the budget share of 
other government expenditures in Indonesia. 
The results of the interviews indicate the possible low acceptability of 
emission tax. Besides the fact that firms will try to avoid additional cost, this 
obstacle could be occurred due to the firms’ lack of awareness of the 
environmental problems and the reluctance of firms to pay another tax 
additional to currently existing corporate taxes. The reluctance to pay 
emission tax could also be triggered by the lack of transparency in the 
utilization of tax revenue. Therefore, the firms cannot distinguish whether 
the tax revenue is truly allocated to compensate for the harmful impact of 
production activities on the environment. 
Theoretically, the implementation of emission tax will be able to lessen the 
adverse impact of production waste although the government does not 
necessarily direct the utilization of tax revenue on public abatement. The 
emission tax charges the polluters proportionally to the generated pollution.  
Therefore, the adoption of emission tax will encourage them to decrease the 
volume of emission or to adopt more environmentally friendly technology.  
The reluctance of firms to pay the taxes due to the obscurity of the taxes 
revenue utilization could be originated in the sceptical perception toward 
the integrity of bureaucracy in Indonesia. The firms are unconvinced that the 
collected revenue would be allocated for public goods' provision without 
leakage due to corruption within the bureaucracy. 
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This chapter reveals the presence of firms’ noncompliance and tax officials’ 
corruption in Indonesia. Inability of the monitoring mechanism to observe 
the tax compliance of firms and to examine the conduct of tax officials with 
regard to the practice of corruption is also confirmed. Furthermore, the 
interview finds a compelling issue.  Instead of relying on the sanction to 
enforce the compliance of firms and tax officials, enforcement could take an 
alternative way in the form of providing positive incentive. Another 
conclusion that could be drawn is the necessity of emission tax, although the 
evasion should be anticipated. 
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Chapter 3 
EMISSION TAX SCHEME UNDER THE PRESENCE OF BRIBERY:                                           
THEORETICAL FINDINGS MOTIVATED BY THE CASE OF INDONESIA 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The cost of environmental degradation in Indonesia has been highlighted in 
the Country Environmental Analysis by World Bank (2009). According to the 
analysis, environmental degradation is projected to lead to significant health 
and other welfare costs. The World Bank predicts that the environmental 
degradation cost will grow in the future at the same annual GDP rate.  The 
efforts of the Indonesian government have not yet succeeded in reducing 
the rate of environmental damage and pollution carried by the industries. 
Thus, to prevent a further environmental degradation and to raise the 
responsibility of the polluting firms, the government has planned to 
implement the emission tax (Hasan and Puspitasari, 2008). 
The results of the in-depth interview as presented in chapter two verify the 
necessity for the emission tax adoption. However, the results also suggest 
that the tax evasion should be anticipated. The tax will obviously increase 
the cost of the firms. From the viewpoint of the industry, cost can be 
lessened by minimizing its tax compliance.   Since monitoring mechanism to 
enforce the compliance is costly, compliance behaviour of the firms is not 
fully known to the government’s agency. In this case, the firms may tend to 
evade their tax liability. The findings of in-depth interviews have confirmed 
the presence of tax evasion and the deficiency of the monitoring mechanism 
on the compliance behaviour of the firms in Indonesia. Tax evasion is an 
illegal action designed to lessen tax liability, particularly by underreporting 
the tax objects. Underreporting refers to the activity of taxpayers who 
intentionally declare the tax liability less than the actual amount.   In the 
case of emission tax, evasion could be translated into underreporting the 
actual level of emission to reduce the tax payment. 
The problem of taxation is complicated further by the issue of corruption. 
The survey of Transparency International Indonesia in 2010 places the 
taxation office at the top of the list of corrupt governmental institutions in 
Indonesia. This fact is consistent with the in-depth interview findings, which 
indicate that the corruption at the mid  and low level of the taxation office is 
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still persistent, and the monitoring efforts to prevent disfunctional behaviour 
of tax officials is still deficient. Although the government has tried to 
introduce the reformation in the taxation sector, including the increase in tax 
officials’ remuneration and stricter internal monitoring within the Taxation 
Office, the practice of corruption cannot be entirely eradicated. The internal 
monitoring unit is responsible for supervising the compliance of officials with 
the standards. However, this unit cannot effectively observe the behaviour 
of tax officials due to the limitation of resources. 
Corruption has been considered in the existing environmental literature at 
the macro level as one of the major causes for environmental damage. The 
cross-countries comparative study of Desai (1998) indicates that violations 
on environmental policies could become stronger when corruption takes 
place. The study shows that corruption by the mid and low level of officials is 
endemic in industrializing countries, and the infringement on environmental 
regulation is widespread. Using panel data from a mix of developed and 
developing countries from 1982 to 1992, Damania et al. (2003) provides 
evidence that corruption leads to poor policy formulation, management, and 
enforcement that could become serious problems for environmental 
sustainability.  These findings are supported by the cross-countries study of 
Morse (2006). Using the data of Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and 
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), the study suggests an adverse 
relationship between corruption and environmental sustainability. 
Rose-Ackerman (1978) distinguishes two types of corruption. The first type 
occurs in the relationship between the citizens and the elected policy 
makers, which typically leads to policy distortions. The second type exists in 
the bureaucracy, where the practice of bribery may hamper the intended 
effects of policies. Similar to the classification of corruption proposed by 
Rose-Ackerman (1978), the World Bank (2000) defines the corruption into 
two categories, grand and petty corruption. Grand corruption refers to 
attempts to influence the policy making by delivering payments to the 
politicians, while the petty corruption indicates the bribes directed to the 
administering officials in an attempt to elude the consequences of certain 
policies. Consequently, the grand corruption afflicts the policy setting while 
the petty corruption impedes the level of compliance. 
This study will deal with the issue of petty corruption in the environmental 
context, the bribery that occurs at policy implementation level between the 
polluting firms and the officials. The study of bribery in an environmental 
perspective is crucial since the significance of enforcement will be weakened 
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when the officials engage in bribery (O’Connor, 1994). Under the presence of 
bribery, the violator of environmental regulation can be exempted from the 
penalty because of the financial influence that they may utilize to bribe the 
officials.  The decline of deterrence effectiveness will hamper the attempt to 
restrict environmental degradation.  However, the issue of bribery is less-
researched in the environmental literature at the micro level, particularly 
concerning the compliance behaviour of the regulated polluters. 
This theoretical study is aimed at investigating the scheme that will improve 
compliance with emission tax under the presence of bribery. This study may 
help the government in which the system is afflicted with bribery, such as 
Indonesia, in finding the policy mixture to aid the enforcement of emission 
tax compliance. Inspired by the case of Indonesia, this study may offer the 
insight for other developing countries that share the similar characteristic of 
institutional situation and taxation setting. 
The rest of the paper is ordered as follows. The next section following this 
introduction part, will present the brief review of literature on similar issues 
of environmental taxation. The theoretical model is presented afterwards. 
The model will describe the optimal behaviour of firms and the tax officials, 
and formulate optimal policy for Ministry of Finance (MoF). The last section 
will provide the conclusion. 
 
3.2. THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW  
As described by Polinsky and Shavell (2000), the literature on environmental 
regulation and enforcement follows from studies on optimal penalties in the 
law and economics. The theoretical study of Harford (1978) is among the 
first research on the emission tax compliance. Harford extends the seminal 
work of Becker (1968) on crime and punishment5 to examine the compliance 
behaviour of the firm under imperfectly enforceable pollution taxes, 
assuming that the firm aims at expected profit maximization.  He derives a 
conclusion from his theoretical study that the actual pollutant level of the 
firm is determined by the pollution tax rate, while the probability of 
detection and the severity of sanction only affect the reported pollutant but 
not the actual pollutant. Therefore, increasing the fine and intensity of the 
audit will lead to more tax compliance, but not to a lower level of pollution. 
                                            
5 Becker (1968) establishes the strand of economics of crime, which focuses on dissuasion 
of potential crime by punishment on the basis of observable and verifiable behaviour. 
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Further interpretation of his theoretical results concludes that increasing the 
tax rate will lessen the emitted pollutants. However, a higher tax rate will 
decrease the reported pollutants in a bigger scale, thus, suggesting an 
increase in the tax evasion. Reinganum and Wilde (1985) consider the 
detection probability and sanction rate in their analytical model.  The impact 
of detection probability and noncompliance penalty on tax compliance are 
postulated as positive, and they conclude that some combination of these 
variables will provide an optimal tax policy.  However, they do not determine 
the proper combination in their paper. 
Bontem and Bourgeon (2005) examine the optimal environmental taxation 
and enforcement policy in the principal-agent problem setting. Their 
theoretical study models the setting with a self-reporting system, where the 
abatement cost is unknown to the regulator and emission level can be 
detected through a costly audit. Their result points out that the optimal level 
of tax will be higher than Pigovian's level because of the adverse-selection 
problem. The firms may hide the true level of emission to decrease the tax 
liability; therefore, the tax should cover the costly enforcement to prevent 
the tax evasion.  Further results show that the optimal auditing effort of the 
regulator’s agency is inversely related to the tax paid by the firms and their 
pollution levels. 
The study of Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) also focuses on the 
optimal audit policy to ensure compliance with environmental tax. Their 
theoretical study on the impact of the audit policy on an individual firm, 
finds that the audit has a deterrence impact on both the actual level of 
emission and the reported emission.  This result is different with the 
theoretical findings of Harford (1978) that suggest the increase in audits 
increases the tax compliance but does not decrease the level of emission. 
The difference is due to a different hypothesis on the audit policy. Macho-
Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) argue that when the auditor decides to 
distribute the auditing intensity in a population of firms, the auditor may 
allocate the limited resources in a method where the firms do not behave as 
assumed by Harford (1978). Their analysis also suggests further that firms 
will always evade the environmental tax, unless the monitoring budget is 
exceptionally large. 
The effectiveness of environmental policies is often hampered by corruption. 
The theoretical study of Damania (2002) extends the literature by examining 
the problem of pollution tax in a corrupt bureaucracy. The analysis reveals 
that spending resources to monitor the emission is unproductive in the 
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setting plagued with bribery, unless the severity of prosecution is increased 
adequately.  According to his analysis, the optimal emission tax requires that 
the net marginal benefits from the instrument for pollution and corruption 
deterrence are equalized. This finding contradicts the Pigovian principle that 
emission tax should be equal to the marginal damage from pollution.  In the 
corrupt system, a higher tax provides a stronger incentive to underreport, 
which should be balanced by increasing the auditing. Therefore, the optimal 
solution requires the marginal benefit from taxation to be traded off against 
the marginal benefit from auditing. This result implies that the ability of the 
government to control the emission is strictly limited if the auditing is 
expensive. He also finds that the tax rate rises with the reported emission 
while the audit rate decreases with the reported emission. 
The study of Wilson and Damania (2005) is among a few theoretical studies 
on the interplay between bribery and emission tax.  Bribery may determine 
the level of compliance, since it reflects the payment by the regulated firms 
to the regulator’s agency for avoiding the consequences of an environmental 
policy. Their study considers the setting in which the firm creates pollution 
and the government as the regulator tries to control it by setting emission 
tax. The regulator delegates the task of observing the level of emission to the 
inspector. The tax liability paid by the firm is based on the reported emission 
assessed by the inspector. Since it is mutually beneficial to both of them, the 
inspector and the firm may engage in bribery and agree to underreport the 
actual emission level. The audit conducted by the regulator can reveal the 
true emission level with a certain probability, and the penalty will be 
imposed on both the firm and the inspector.  The results of their study 
suggest that under the presence of bribery an increase in the emission tax 
rate induces a decline in the actual emission, since higher taxes increase the 
cost of production and thus, reduce the production and pollution levels. 
Nevertheless, a higher tax raises the payoff from tax evasion that leads to an 
increasing level of noncompliance. The study also shows that a higher fine 
reduces the emission and noncompliance level. 
Most theoretical literature on environmental policies and taxes focus on the 
role of auditing and fines imposed on the compliance. The impact of 
financial reward on compliance with environmental policies has scarcely 
been investigated.  Swierzbinski (1994) introduces the financial reward as an 
additional instrument of deterrence policies in environmental taxation. He 
examines the optimal environmental tax when the abatement cost of 
polluting firms is unknown to the regulator and observing the actual 
emission is costly. The enforcement effort of the regulator is restricted with 
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the limitation of available resources. His model allows the regulator to 
choose the reward for the compliant firms, apart from conventional 
deterrence instruments such as penalty and auditing. 
The findings of his study suggest that the optimal scheme will be similar to a 
deposit-refund system. The system refers to the plan where the firms are 
charged with the environmental tax and the reward is given afterwards 
following the auditing process for the compliant firms (whereas the cheating 
firms are inflicted with the penalty). Further results suggest that when the 
maximum possible fines for violations are lower than the maximum reward, 
the decision to decrease emission is determined by the probability of 
monitoring. On the other hand, if the maximum available reward is lower 
than the maximum fine, compliance's decision is mostly driven by the 
variation in the tax rate. 
The role of financial reward has scarcely been considered, even in the wider 
literature of tax evasion. The study of Falkinger and Walther (1991) is among 
a few papers that are concerned with the potential influence of monetary 
reward.  Falkinger and Walther (1991) introduce the pecuniary reward as an 
economic incentive for tax payment into their tax evasion model. Their 
theoretical analysis shows that the introduction of the reward leads to a 
welfare improvement of the taxpayers and thus, discourages the taxpayers 
to evade the tax.  
Among a few papers that analyse the impact of financial reward and the 
bribery on compliance with emission tax, none observes the effect of 
financial reward and the bribery in combination.  This study intends to fill 
that gap. This study is expected to contribute to emission tax literature by 
examining the role of financial reward on the compliance under the 
presence of bribery. Furthermore, this study also includes the bribe rate (the 
cost of bribe) as one of the compliance determinants under the presence of 
bribery, a variable that has not been considered in the literature of 
environmental compliance. 
 
3.3. THE MODEL 
This study intends to analyse the optimal emission tax scheme to encourage 
compliance. Ministry of Finance aims to regulate the pollution emitted by 
the polluting firms through the implementation of emission tax.  In the self-
assessment taxation system, the MoF provides the polluting firms with the 
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right to assess the emission level. The firms submit the report and pay the 
tax liability accordingly to tax officials acting as the agents of the MoF.  To 
enforce the compliance of firms and prevent the firms from underreporting 
the emission level, the MoF charges the noncompliant firms with sanction 
and compensates the compliant firms with monetary reward. The  MoF 
delegates administrative authority to tax officials, entrusts the officials to 
accept the emission report and collect the tax from polluting firms, audit the 
emission, and deliver the sanction or reward. To encourage the officials 
performing the delegated tasks honestly, the MoF charges the penalty for 
the corrupt officials and reward the officials who reveal the underreporting. 
The model in this theoretical study refers to the work of Wilson and 
Damania (2005) on the interplay between petty corruption and emission tax 
compliance.  The petty corruption reflects the bribery practice between the 
polluting firms and administering officials, in which the bribe is provided by 
the firms to avoid the consequence of environmental policies. For simplicity, 
the model of Wilson and Damania (2005) focuses on the case of a single firm 
that emits pollution as a result of the production process, which is regulated 
through an emission tax. The model adopts the normalization that each unit 
of output generates a unit of emission. 
Given the problem of asymmetric information, the government in the model 
of Wilson and Damania (2005) should rely on the service of an inspector to 
assess emission levels. The tax is levied on the emission level reported by the 
inspector hired by the government. The firm may offer a bribe to the 
inspector to persuade a report of emission below the actual level. The level 
of reported emission and the bribe rate are determined through bargaining, 
and the model solves the equilibrium level of emission report and bribe rate 
with Nash bargain. The government can authorize an audit to deter 
noncompliance.  If any underreporting activity is revealed during the audit, 
both the firm and the inspector will be prosecuted. 
Deviating from the model of Wilson and Damania (2005), this study assumes 
that the report of emission levels is a private decision of the firm instead of a 
joint decision between the firm and the government agent. According to 
Taxation Law No. 28/2007, the taxation in Indonesia applies the self-
assessment system.  This system provides the tax payers with a full 
responsibility to calculate, report, and pay their tax obligation. The findings 
of in-depth interview also indicate that the meeting between the firms and 
tax officials is limited due to the installment of online tax filling system. 
Furthermore, this assumption is consistent with the problem of costly 
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monitoring where the MoF may not be able to assign the examination of all 
firms in a due time. Therefore, the firm decides the level of reported 
emission independently and the tax official only chooses the firms to audit 
after receiving all reports.  
The MoF in this study may offer the financial reward to encourage the 
compliance of the firms, thus, expanding the model of Wilson and Damania 
(2005). The necessity of financial reward for compliance is confirmed with 
the findings of in-depth interview as presented in the chapter two of this 
dissertation.  Following Swierzbinski (1994), the reward scheme resembles a 
deposit-refund system. The reward is given after the accuracy of the 
emission report is confirmed with the audit. Firstly, the firm submits the 
emission report and pays the tax accordingly, and then the firm receives a 
rebate if the reported and actual emission levels are identical. However, the 
government is also committed to charging a sanction if the actual emission is 
inconsistent with the initial report. The present model extends the existing 
literature of emission tax compliance by bringing together the influence of 
financial reward and bribery, in the setting where the financial reward is 
introduced under the presence of bribery. 
Consider a firm discharges emission (e) as a result of the production process.  
Following Wilson and Dalmania (2005), this study adopts the normalization 
that one unit of output generates a single unit of emission. Emission leads to 
environmental damage ε[e], with ε’>0 and ε”>0.  
To internalize the pollution cost and raise the responsibility of the polluting 
firms, the MoF charges an emission tax (t) on each unit of emission. The tax 
is levied on the level of reported emission (r).  The accrued tax revenue (t r) 
can be used by the MoF for social benefits, either for environmental 
purposes or the provision of other public goods. The social benefit from 
emission tax is expressed by ].[ rt , where the benefit (λ) is the function of 
tax revenue and characterized by 0].[' rt  and 0].[" rt . The social benefit 
increases with a higher tax revenue. 
The MoF provides the firm with full authority to assess and report their 
emission levels to the tax official, which is acting on behalf of the MoF.  The 
firm may cheat by reporting emission level below the actual level, and thus, 
underpaying the tax.  To encourage the compliance of the firm, the MoF 
punishes the cheating firm that reports incorrect emission level with a 
sanction. The sanction will be levied proportionally to the amount of avoided 
tax. The amount of the sanction is expressed by s t (e - r), where s is the 
sanction rate. To provide more incentives for the firms to comply with 
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emission tax, the MoF may provide a monetary reward to the compliant firm 
that reports the true level of emission.  The monetary reward will be offered 
proportionally to the amount of tax paid liability and expressed by i t e, 
where i is the reward rate.  Since the true level of emission is unknown to 
the MoF, the sanction and reward can only be decided after the level of 
emission is examined through an audit. 
The audit is conducted after the firms submit their report and pay the tax. 
Since the budget is limited, the audit cannot observe the emission level of all 
firms. Therefore, the firm can only be audited with a certain probability, ρ. 
The probability of the firm getting audited is characterized by ρ[ã+r], where 
the probability (ρ) is a function of the audit budget of the MoF (ã) and the 
reported emission of the firm (r). The properties of the audit probability with 
regard to the audit budget are defined with ρ’[ã]>0. The probability of being 
audited is higher (lower) when the budget allocated by the MoF on audit 
increases (decreases)6. On the other hand, properties of audit probability 
with regard to reported emission are expressed with ρ’[r]<0 and ρ’’[r]>0. The 
probability of getting audited is lower (higher) if the reported emission level 
is higher (lower). The last condition is consistent with the existing literature, 
which demonstrates that the optimal audit frequency is decreasing with the 
report (see, e.g. Heyes, 2000; Damania, 2002; Wilson and Damania, 2005). 
The MoF authorizes the tax officials to collect the tax, audit the report, and 
deliver the sanction or financial reward to the suitable firm. Tax officials get a 
fixed wage, w, for performing their task. The audit frequency is determined 
by the MoF in accordance with the available budget, while the decision on 
which firms to be audited is left to the officials. The officials decide which 
firms to audit among all firms that have submitted the reports. If the audit 
confirms that the firms underreport the emission, and consequently 
underpay the tax, the officials proceed to administer the sanction.  On the 
other hand, in the case where the financial reward for compliance is 
available, tax officials deliver the monetary reward for firms that submit the 
accurate emission level. 
The cheating firm may try to bribe the tax official to elude the sanction. The 
tax official decides the rate of the bribe that should be paid in exchange with 
the sanction exemption.  The amount of the bribe is assumed to be 
                                            
6 For the sake of simplicity, this study assumes that the probability of audit is a linear 
function of the allocated budget on audit (ρ’’[ã]>0). The budget increase will be 
translated into higher audit frequency, thus probability of audit, at a constant scale. 
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proportional to the amount of sanction and expressed by b s t (e-r), where b 
is the bribe rate. 
To encourage tax officials performing the task honestly, the MoF conducts an 
inspection to examine the behaviour of the tax officials and imposes the 
penalty to the corrupt officials. The penalty is a function of unreported 
emission (e-r), with 0]['  rep  and 0][''  rep , meaning that the severity of 
penalty is increasing with the size of underreported emission. The 
probability that the corrupt official is inspected given by [â+r], where the 
inspection probability () is a function of the MoF’s budget allocated on 
inspection (â) and the reported emission of the firm (r). The probability is 
characterized by ’[â] > 07, 0][' r  and 0][" r . It indicates that the 
probability of inspection is higher (lower) when the budget allocated on 
inspection is higher (lower) or the reported emission is lower (higher).   In 
addition to the penalty, the MoF introduces the monetary reward for the tax 
officials to reveal the underreporting emission, proportional to the 
recovered loss from the unpaid tax (revenue from sanction). The amount of 
the reward is given by η s t (e-r), where η is the reward rate for the tax 
officials. The officials who find the evasion may directly propose the reward 
from the MoF. This reward scheme is stemmed from the basic insight of 
principal-agent theory, where a principal (the MoF) can encourage agents 
(tax officials) to perform optimal actions, although the principal only able to 
observe the outcome of the agents’ actions, through incentive provision.  
The strategic interaction between the MoF, tax official, and polluting firm is 
modelled as a three stages game. In the first stage, the MoF sets the 
emission tax rate and enforcement instruments to deter noncompliance of 
polluting firms and tax officials. In the second stage, the official decides the 
optimal bribe rate.  Considering the values of enforcement instruments and 
the bribe rate, the polluting firm decides the optimal level of reported 
emission. The game will be solved using backward induction. Backward 
induction is a common iterative procedure for solving sequential games. In 
the backward induction, the optimal strategy of the last player to move in 
the game is determined first. Then, the optimal decision of the next-to-last 
moving player is solved, given the action of the last player. The process 
continues until the strategies of all players are solved (Shor, 2005). In this 
                                            
7 Similar to the probability of audit faced by the firm, the probability of tax official being 
inspected is also assumed to be a linear function of the allocated budget on inspection, 
therefore ρ’’[ã]>0.   
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study, first the optimal reported emission level of the polluting firm is solved, 
and then the optimal bribe rate of the tax official is determined. The optimal 
policy for the MoF is formulated afterward, once the optimal decision of the 
firm and the official are obtained. 
3.3.1. The optimal behavior of the firm   
The optimal behaviour of firms in determining the reported emission is 
analysed under two different situations with regard to bribery situation, the 
setting without bribery and the setting with bribery. In each setting, first the 
optimal behaviour of the firm is observed without the availability of financial 
reward. Afterward, the financial reward is introduced and optimal decision 
of the firm is examined. 
3.3.1.1 The optimal behavior of the firm under the absence of bribery 
The MoF relies on sanction and audit to deter the noncompliance. The MoF 
announces the emission tax rate (t) and sanction rate for noncompliance (s). 
The MoF also announces the available budget for the auditing purpose.  The 
firm is aware that the probability of being audited (ρ) is determined by the 
audit budget of the MoF (ã) and the reported emission (r).   
The firm makes a decision regarding the optimal reported emission (r) given 
the announced tax rate (t), sanction rate (s) and the audit probability (ρ). The 
profit from emitting the pollutant is expressed by ][e , where e is the actual 
level of emission, with 0][' e and 0]['' e . It is assumed that one unit 
output linearly correlates with one unit of emission; therefore, e may reflect 
the level of output. 
The payoff of producing emission for the compliant firm is given by 
teec   . The payoff is simply the difference between the profit of 
production that discharges emission and the emission tax payment. The 
payoff of the noncompliant firm, which submits the report (r) lower than 
actual emission (e), is defined by   restrtrc   . . The payoff consists 
of the profit of generating emission less than the cost of the tax payment 
and expected sanction from tax evasion. Obviously, if the firm decides to 
submit the correct emission report,  rc , will be equal to 
e
c . The gain from 
underreporting emission and evading tax payment is given by the following 
equation. 
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 restretc   )(       
(1) 
 
Equation (1) is simply the difference between the payoff of cheating and the 
payoff of compliance. The gain is the saved tax payment from submitting the 
emission report lower than the actual level, less the expected penalty for 
underpaying the tax. The noncompliant firm decides the level of reported 
emission that maximizes the gain.  The condition for optimal reported 
emission is given by First Order Condition (FOC) of equation (). 
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Rewriting equation (2) in terms of r,  
















st
r
tst
er


 
         (3) 
Where 0
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r
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.  
 
Equation (3) implies that it is optimal for polluting firm to report the 
emission level accurately if the marginal gain of underreporting the emission 
is zero, meaning that the saved tax payment is equal to the expected 
sanction for each change of underreported emission. However, the optimal 
report will be less than the actual emission level if that condition is not 
achievable.  In the latter case, the optimal report will be lower than the 
actual emission and the gap between the two levels indicates the marginal 
gain of underreporting emission. 
The impact of each enforcement instrument on optimal reported emission is 
demonstrated by comparative statics, deriving from of the equation (2) using 
implicit differentiation.  
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Comparative statics of tax rate impact on optimal reported emission in 
equation (4) shows that optimal report is decreasing with the tax rate (t). 
However, equation (4) provides an intriguing intuition that the optimal 
reported emission may increase with the tax rate, if the marginal expected 
sanction is higher than the marginal expected benefit from evasion as the 
tax rate changes. This possibility is justified since the size of sanction 
increases with the evaded tax, therefore, a higher tax rate will lead to a 
bigger sanction. A firm will attempt to avoid the larger sanction by increasing 
the reported emission as the tax rate increases.  However, this condition 
requires the MoF to set exceedingly high audit frequency and sanction 
severity, which are less likely obtainable in the reality due to the limitation of 
budget. 
Equation (5) and (6) show that optimal reported emission increases with the 
sanction rate (s) and audit budget (ã). A higher sanction rate for 
noncompliance and a higher audit frequency due to the increase in the 
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budget will impose more pressure on the firm to increase the reported 
income. 
When the MoF introduces the financial reward for compliance, the expected 
payoff from generating emission to the compliant firm is defined by 
iteteec   .  Now the firm may expect an additional income in the form 
of a financial reward for reporting the true level of emission.  A financial 
reward is conditional upon probability of the audit since the reward is 
granted after the accuracy of the report is confirmed through auditing. The 
payoff from reporting accurately is the profit from generating emission and 
the expected financial reward less the cost of tax payment. The payoff to the 
noncompliant firm from generating emission is given by 
 )( resttrrc   . The payoff is the profit less the tax payment, the 
expected cost of the sanction and the expected loss of financial reward for 
compliance.  The gain from underreporting emission is given by the 
following equation. 
     
))(()( iterestretc    
         (7) 
 
The gain is the saved tax payment from submitting the understated emission, 
less the expected sanction and the loss of financial reward for compliance.  
The condition for optimal reported emission that gives a maximum payoff to 
the firm is given by FOC of equation (7). 
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The optimal reported emission is obtained by rewriting the equation (8) in 
terms of r.   
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When the financial reward is available, the optimal reported emission is 
higher than the previous report without the reward at equation (3). After the 
introduction of a financial reward, the marginal cost of underreporting 
emission is higher and it leads to the decrease in marginal gain of evasion for 
each unit change of reported emission. 
The impact of each enforcement instrument on optimal reported emission is 
demonstrated by comparative statics below, using implicit differentiation on 
equation (8). 
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Comparative statics show that optimal reported emission is decreasing with 
the tax rate (t) and increasing with available audit budget (ã), sanction rate 
(s), and financial reward rate (i).  Comparison of the instruments' impact on 
reported emission before and after the introduction of financial reward 
shows that the negative impact of the tax rate impact on reported emission 
is lower when the financial reward is provided. The same case also applies to 
the impact of the sanction rate and the available budget for audit. It shows 
that the insertion of financial reward pushes out the impact of other 
enforcement instruments. 
It is intriguing to see from equation (10) that theoretically the positive 
impact of the tax rate on the reported emission is more achievable with the 
implementation of a financial reward.  The marginal cost of evading the tax 
(the sum of the expected marginal sanction and the expected marginal loss 
of financial reward) may exceed the marginal benefit of evasion per unit 
change in reported emission, if the probability of the audit is high enough 
and it is accompanied with extremely high sanction and financial reward 
rate. 
The comparison of sanction and financial reward impact on the reported 
emission yields an ambiguous conclusion. The impact of financial reward will 
be higher than the impact of the sanction if the optimal reported emission 
as expresses in equation (9) is close to the actual level.  On the other hand, 
the impact of the sanction is superior to the financial reward if the optimal 
reported emission is much lower than the actual emission. A financial 
reward is only given to the firm that reports its emission level truthfully.    
Although the firm increases the emission report, the reward will not be 
granted if the requirement to declare the actual level is not met.  Shifting the 
noncompliant to compliant behaviour by reporting the true level of emission 
is less favourable to the firm if the expected gain from cheating is much 
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higher.  Therefore, the financial reward is only attractive for the firm if the 
gap between the optimal report and the actual level of emission is narrow. 
On the other hand, the intensity of sanction is defined by the degree of 
noncompliance; the gap between the reported and actual levels of emission.  
The sanction will be more severe if the size of the underreported emission is 
wider. A sanction allows the polluting firm to adjust its behaviour according 
to the tolerated level of expected loss.   The firm may adapt to the severity of 
the sanction by manipulating the report. If the sanction is more severe as 
the sanction rate increases, the firm may lower the expected cost by 
increasing the reported emission. Therefore, the impact of a sanction will be 
more considerable than a financial reward when the gap between the 
optimal report and the actual emission level is wide.   However, the sanction 
does not necessarily induce the firm to declare the real emission level. 
3.3.1.2. The optimal behavior of the firm under the presence of bribery 
The previous case models the optimal behaviour of the polluting firm when 
tax officials are prevented from having a corrupting behaviour. This section 
will observe optimal behaviour of the firm when the officials are willing to 
engage in bribery. 
When the financial reward is not offered, the payoff to the firm that 
correctly reports the true level of emission is expressed by teec   , the 
difference between the profit of generating emission (π) and the emission 
tax payment (t e, where t and e are tax rate and real emission level 
respectively).  The payoff of the cheating firm that submits a reported 
emission (r) lower than actual emission (e) is defined by 
  rebsttrrc   . The payoff is the profit of generating emission less 
the cost of understated tax payment and the expected cost of evading the 
tax. Since the tax officials are willing to engage in bribery, the sanction to the 
cheating firm is replaced by bribe,  rebst  , where b is bribe rate and s 
indicates the sanction rate. The bribe rate demanded by the corrupt officials 
is positive but less than 1, 1>b>0, suggesting that the total amount of bribe 
should be less than the sanction. It is clear that if the total amount of bribe is 
at least equal to sanction8, the rational firms will avoid engaging in bribery.  
The condition of audit probability () is given by ρ’[ã]>0, ρ’[r]<0 and ρ’’[r]>0, 
where ã and r are audit budget and reported emission respectively. 
                                            
8 where b = 1, meaning that the demanded bribe is 100 percent of the sanction.  
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The gain from underreporting emission for the noncompliant firm is 
presented by the following equation. 
 
 rebstretc   )(  
         (14) 
 
The gain is composed of the saved tax payment from underreporting 
emission less the expected cost of bribe if the report is getting audited. The 
firm decides the level of the emission report that maximizes the payoff.  The 
FOC is given by the following equation. 
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Rewriting the FOC in terms of r will provide the following condition of 
optimal emission report. 
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Equation (16) shows that the optimal level of reported emission is lower 
than the optimal report when bribery is prevented in equation (7).  Instead 
of the sanction, the cost of evading the emission tax under the presence of 
bribery is determined by the bribe. Since the expected evasion cost is lower, 
the firm will gain more benefit by increasing the size of underreported 
emission through reduction of the reported emission. 
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The following comparative statics provide the impact of each instrument on 
reported emission. 
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Optimal reported emission is decreasing with the tax rate (t).  The decrease 
in the reported emission (r) as the tax rate increases, is larger than the 
reduction of reported emission under the absence of bribery in equation (4) 
and equation (10).  The previous result as shown by equation (4) gives a hint 
that the increase in the tax rate may increase the optimal reported emission 
if the intensity of audit and severity of the sanction is high enough to offset 
the benefit of cheating, and that possibility is even bigger when a financial 
reward is offered in equation (10). However, when bribery becomes 
prevalent, it is less likely that the increase in the tax rate will lead to a higher 
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reported emission.  Although the audit is conducted more frequently, 
bribery shrinks the deterrence power of the sanction.  
The optimal report is increasing with the available budget on audit (ã), 
sanction rate (s), and bribe rate (b). The impacts of the audit budget and 
sanction rate under the presence of bribery are equal to those under the 
absence of bribery. Given that the bribe rate is lower than the sanction rate, 
the impact of the bribe rate on the reported emission (equation (20) )is 
stronger than the impact of the sanction rate (equation (18) ).  Although the 
sanction rate is set at a higher rate, the actual effect is weaker once tax 
officials are willing to omit the sanction for the bribe.  Therefore, the optimal 
behaviour of a cheating firm will be more influenced by the bribe rate 
instead of the sanction rate. 
When the MoF introduces the financial reward for compliance, denoted by  i 
t e  (where i, t and e are reward rate, tax rate, and actual emission level 
respectively),  the payoff of generating emission for the compliant firm 
under the presence of bribery is described by iteteec   . The payoff is 
the gain from generating emission (π) and the expected financial reward (ρ i 
t e), less the cost of emission tax payment (t e). The payoff for the 
noncompliant firm is given by  )( rebsttrrc   , the profit of 
generating emission less the sum of underpaid tax payment and expected 
bribe.  The gain from underreporting emission is given by the following 
equation. 
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The gain consists of the tax saving resulted from underreporting the 
emission less the expected bribe cost and the loss of financial reward for 
reporting the emission truthfully.   The FOC of equation (21) is following. 
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The optimal reported emission (r) can be obtained by rewriting equation (22) 
in terms of r.  
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The current optimal reported emission is higher than the report without the 
offer of financial reward (equation (16) ).  Financial reward increases the 
marginal cost of underreporting emission and reduces the marginal gain 
from the evasion.  However, since the bribe practically replaces the sanction 
(hence reduces the marginal cost of underreporting), this optimal report is 
lower than the report when financial reward is granted in the absence of 
bribery (equation (9) ). 
The comparative statics derived from the FOC in equation (22) are presented 
below. 
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The optimal reported emission is decreasing with the tax rate (t) and 
increasing with the available budget of the MoF allocated on audit (ã), 
sanction rate (s), bribe rate (b), and financial reward rate (i).  Under the 
presence of bribery, the negative impact of a tax rate on reported emission is 
smaller when a financial reward for compliance is introduced. It suggests 
that the firm will be less responsive to the change in the tax rate, and the 
increase in the tax rate will induce less reduction of reported emission 
compared to that without financial reward.  However, the deterrence impact 
of sanction rate, audit budget, and bribe rate on the optimal report is also 
weaker when the reward is offered. 
Similar to the previous situation without the availability of financial reward, 
the impact of the bribe rate on the optimal report is higher than the impact 
of the sanction rate. To the cheating firm, the actual punishment for 
underreporting is determined by the bribe rate set by the corrupt official. 
Therefore, the firms will be more influenced by the bribe rate rather than 
the formal sanction rate. 
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The impact of financial reward will be higher than the impact of the sanction 
only if the optimal reported emission as expresses in equation (23) is 
approaching the actual level, otherwise the impact of the sanction will be 
superior to the impact of financial reward. 
The financial reward will have a greater impact on reported emission than a 
bribe only if the optimal reported emission is close to the actual emission 
level, and the bribe is so expensive that it is approaching the size of the 
sanction. Bribing to evade the sanction is less appealing than the 
anticipation of financial reward when the size of requested bribe is almost 
equal to the sanction.  Once the gap between the optimal report and the 
actual level is narrowed, shifting from noncompliance to compliance 
behaviour will be less costly for a firm.  However, reporting accurately will 
create a considerable loss of gain for the cheating firm if this gap is wide and 
the size of bribe is considerably smaller than the sanction.  In this case, the 
firm will be inclined to underreport the emission and anticipate the bribe. 
Financial reward is less significant to stimulate the compliance of the firm 
when bribery is not curbed.  The bribe nullifies the severity of a sanction, 
decreases the marginal cost of evasion and thus raises the gain of 
underreporting emission. On the other hand, the cost of evading the 
emission tax is higher when the financial reward is available; therefore, a 
decrease in the bribe rate will be responded by the cheating firm with a 
lesser reduction in reported emission.   
3.3.2. The optimal behavior of the tax official   
The optimal behaviour of the tax official is observed under two different 
cases regarding the availability of a financial reward for revealing 
underreported emission.   The first case observes the optimal behaviour of 
tax officials when a financial reward is not offered, while the second case 
examines the optimal behaviour when the financial reward is available. 
In the first case, the payoff to the tax official from exposing underreported 
emission is simply defined by w
h
t  , where w  is the fixed wage.  The 
corrupt tax official decides the optimal bribe rate (b), given the probability of 
inspection ( ) and the penalty for taking the bribe (p). The probability that 
the corrupt official is inspected given by  [â+r], where â represents the 
MoF’s budget allocated on inspection and r symbolizes the reported 
emission of the firm. The probability is characterized by ’[â] > 0, 0][' r  
and 0][" r . The penalty is a function of unreported emission (e-r), with 
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0]['  rep  and 0][''  rep , indicating that the penalty for taking bribe is 
increasing with the size of the unpunished evasion. 
The payoff from the taking a bribe and allowing the evasion is expressed by 
 prebstwbt   )( . The payoff is the sum of fixed wage plus the 
expected income from taking the bribe (bst(e-r), where b, s, t, e, and r are 
bribe rate, sanction rate, tax rate, actual emission, and reported emission 
respectively). The income from accepting the bribe is the amount of the 
bribe proportional to the sanction, with a proportion b, less the cost for 
accepting the bribe (the expected penalty if the official is inspected, σ p). 
The gain of accepting the bribe is the difference between the payoff for 
allowing the evasion and the payoff from exposing the underreported 
emission. The gain is represented by the equation below. 
 
prebstt   )(  
         (29) 
 
The maximum payoff from taking the bribe is reached when the marginal 
payoff as the bribe rate changes is equalized to zero.  The FOC of equation 
(29) is formulated by the following equation. 
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Where 0


r

. 
 
Equation (30) can be rearranged with respect to b to find the optimal value 
for bribe rate. 
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Where 0


r

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The bribe rate will be optimal to tax official if it equalizes the expected 
marginal gain of a bribe and the marginal penalty as the bribe rate changes. 
Implicit differentiation on FOC in equation (30) provides comparative statics, 
demonstrating the impact of each enforcement instrument on the optimal 
bribe rate. 
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Optimal bribe rate is increasing with the available budget allocated on 
inspection (â) and severity of penalty (p). The increase in these two 
instruments leads to a higher expected cost of accepting the bribe. This 
increase will be responded by the tax official with increasing the bribe rate to 
compensate the potential loss.  Given that 1
â



, the impact of the penalty 
on the bribe rate (equation (33) ) is stronger than the impact of the budget 
allocated by MoF on inspection (equation (32) ). 
In the second case, the MoF provides a financial reward to the officials who 
are able to reveal the evasion. After the introduction of a financial reward, 
the payoff to the tax official for exposing underreported emission is defined 
by )( restwht   .  The payoff consists of fixed wage (w) and the 
financial reward proportional to amount of the sanction (the revenue 
accrued to the MoF from the revealed evasion) with a proportion η, where η 
indicates the financial reward rate. The payoff for concealing the evasion in 
exchange of bribe is similar to the payoff before financial reward is 
introduced,  prebstwbt   )( . 
After financial reward is available, the payoff from accepting the bribe is 
defined by the following equation. 
 
 )()( restprebstt    
         (34) 
 
FOC of equation (34) is following. 
 
0
)(
)( 




























st
b
r
b
r
r
p
b
r
re
p
bst
b
r
rest
b
t 



 
         (35) 
Where 0


r

. 
 
Rearranging equation (35) in terms of  b, to find the optimal value for bribe 
rate, results in the following condition, 
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Where 0
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
r
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It can be easily recognized from the equation (31) and (36) that the optimal 
bribe rate is higher with the prospective of earning a financial reward.  The 
bribe rate should be high enough to compensate the potential loss from 
concealing the evasion, not only the loss from the expected penalty but also 
the potential reward for exposing the underreported emission.  The 
comparative statics are as follows. 
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The bribe rate is increasing with the allocated budget on inspection (â), the 
penalty for taking a bribe (p), and the financial reward rate (i). Given that 
1
â



, the impact of a penalty on the optimal bribe rate is stronger than 
the impact of the budget spending on inspection. The comparative statics 
show that the impact of financial reward on the bribe rate is bigger than the 
penalty.  Financial reward provides a stronger impact than the penalty since 
the official may apply for the reward directly after discovering the tax 
evasion; while on the other hand, the charge of penalty is subject to the 
probability of being inspected. 
The impact of inspection spending and penalty on the bribe rate is higher 
when the financial reward for revealing evasion is available. In contrast to 
the optimal behaviour of polluting firm, the presence of financial reward 
does not crowd out the impact of other enforcement instruments since the 
reward directed to the tax official is not conditional on the probability of 
inspection. The official who finds the violation on emission tax is eligible for 
the reward, after providing evidence of evasion to the MoF, without waiting 
to be inspected.  Therefore, the financial reward can be considered a direct 
loss to the official for taking the bribe. As the probability of an inspection 
and penalty increase, the marginal cost is higher since the reward is added 
up to the direct cost of taking the bribe. The rational tax official will attempt 
to compensate the cost with a higher bribe rate. 
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3.3.3. The optimal policies of Ministry of Finance   
The MoF intends to internalize the environmental cost of pollution to the 
polluting firms and to utilize the tax revenue on social benefits, such as 
environmental programs and public goods' provisions.  The gain from taxing 
the emission is the social benefit from emission tax, which is a function of 
tax revenue ( ][tr ), less the environmental damage as a function of actual 
emission (ε[e]) since taxing the emission also reflects the permit to emit the 
pollutant. . It is assumed that the level of actual emission (e) is influenced by 
the emission tax rate (t), with e’[t]<o that indicates an increase in tax rate 
will encourage the firm to lower their emission. 
Enforcing compliance with emission tax will accrue a cost to the MoF. The 
enforcement cost is the sum of costly enforcement instruments, including 
the cost of sanction for noncompliant firms (S), penalty  for the tax officials 
(P), financial reward for compliant firms (I), and financial reward for the 
honest tax officials who are able to reveal the evasion (Π)9.  Those costs are 
defined by S[s+(e-r)], P[p+(e-r)],I[i+e], and Π[η+(e-r)],  indicating that the 
expenses of those instruments are the functions of the rate of each 
instrument and the size of the evaded tax (except the expense of financial 
reward for compliant firms, which is determined by the size of actual 
emission).  The characteristic of those instruments are given by S’[s]>0, 
P’[p]>0, I’[i]>0, Π’[η]>0,  S’[e-r]>0, P’[e-r]>0, I'[e]>0, and N’[e-r]>0, meaning 
that the expense is greater as the rate of each instrument and the evaded 
tax (or the actual emission in the case of financial reward for compliant firm, 
I ) is higher. The payoff of the MoF is the gain of the emission tax less the 
cost of emission tax enforcement, and formulated as follows. 
 
    IPSm   
         (40) 
 
The MoF chooses the level of tax rate and enforcement instruments that 
maximize the payoff from emission tax. Taking into consideration the optimal 
                                            
9 Since the size of budget allocated on audit (ã) and inspection (â) are determined by the 
available resource of MoF instead of the size of noncompliance, those instruments are 
assumed to be exogenous variables and excluded from the optimal decision of MoF.  
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behaviour of the firm with respect to tax where 0
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10, the payoff of the MoF with respect to t will be 
obtained under the following FOC. 
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The optimal tax rate can be obtained by rewriting FOC in equation (41) in 
terms of t.  
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The optimal tax rate is equal to marginal gain from the emission tax less the 
marginal cost of enforcement to prevent the evasion for each unit of 
adjustment in social benefit as the tax rate changes. The optimal behaviour 
of the firms indicates that the reported emission, and the actual emission by 
assumption, will decrease with the tax rate. Therefore, the gain of the 
emission tax consists of the social benefit from tax revenue and the 
reduction in environmental damage as the tax rate increases. The optimal 
tax rate is negatively related to the marginal cost of enforcement. If the 
increase in tax rate is responded by higher evasion which leads to a higher 
                                            
10 This assumption is following the seminal work of Harford (1978), which finds that the 
increase in tax rate decreases the reported pollutants in a greater scale than the 
reduction of the actual emission level. These findings suggest that increasing the tax rate 
will escalate the evasion.  This assumption is also based on the fact that decreasing the 
actual level of emission is more difficult to manage (since it requires the application of 
new technology or adjustment of the production process) than manipulating the reported 
level of emission. 
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enforcement cost, the tax should be kept at low rate to maintain the optimal 
condition for the MoF. 
According to the subject to whom the policies are directed, the instruments 
available to the MoF can be classified into two categories.  The first category 
is directed to enforce the compliance of polluting firms, consisted of the 
sanction and financial reward. The second category includes penalty and 
financial for revealing the evasion, is aimed to maintain the compliance of 
tax officials. 
The condition for the optimal sanction rate (s) is obtained from FOC of the 
MoF’s payoff in equation (40) with respect to s and defined by the following 
equation. 
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The equation above implies that the optimal measures are subject to the 
responses of polluting firms in reporting their emission. The optimal 
sanction rate could be found by substituting   
s
r


 
with corresponding impact 
of the sanction on optimal reported emission of the polluting firm. Since the 
responses are different according to the availability of financial reward and 
the willingness of tax officials to engage in bribery, the optimal sanction will 
be unique within each situation.  Let s1, s2 be the sanction rates without and 
with the availability of financial reward respectively under the absence of 
bribery, and s3, s4 be the sanction rates without and with the provision of 
financial reward in the prevalence of bribery. The optimal sanction rates are 
following. 
 
   
 
r
re
r
re
rre
PS
t
tr
s






























2
)(
2
21  
         (44) 
 59 
 
 
   
 
r
re
r
ie
r
re
rre
PS
t
tr
s
































2
)(
2
2
2
2
2      
         (45) 
 
   
 
r
re
r
re
rre
PS
t
tr
s






























2
)(
2
23  
         (46) 
 
   
  

































r
re
r
b
ie
r
re
rre
PS
t
tr
b
s




2
)(
2
2
2
2
4      
         (47)   
Where 0


r
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The optimal rate of sanction (s) should be equal to the marginal benefit of 
sanctioning adjusted by the optimal reported emission of polluting firms due 
to sanction. The benefit of sanctioning consists of the environmental benefit 
and the reduction of enforcement cost as reported emission increases.  
 In general, optimal sanction rate depends on the magnitude of its impact on 
the reported emission. Considering the optimal responses of the firm on the 
sanction, the optimal rate could be higher in the situation without the 
availability of financial reward, both in the absence and the presence of 
bribery. Under the presence of bribery, the sanction rate could be smaller 
with the availability of financial reward.  
The condition of optimal financial reward rate (i) for compliant firms, which 
is obtained from FOC of the MoF’s payoff in equation (40) with respect to i  is 
following. 
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Optimal reward rate could be obtained by substituting 
i
r


 with the 
corresponding impact of financial reward on optimal reported emission of 
polluting firm. Let 21 , ii be the financial reward under the absence and the 
presence of bribery, the optimal rates are the following. 
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The optimal financial reward may increase if the marginal reported emission 
is higher. However, if the firm is not responsive to the financial reward, it will 
be optimal for the MoF to provide a smaller reward.  In the case where 
bribery prevails, the magnitude of financial reward impact is dropped. 
Therefore, the MoF should decrease the financial reward to maintain the 
optimal payoff.  Based on the fact that the impact of financial reward is lower 
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than sanction, the budget to support the financial reward should be lower 
than the allocated budget on the sanction. 
The second category of enforcement is aimed at maintaining the compliance 
of tax officials under the presence of bribery.  This category includes a 
penalty for taking the bribe and financial reward for revealing the evasion. 
Although the instruments are directed at tax officials, the final objective is to 
encourage the compliance of the polluting firms by making the bribery more 
costly. 
The condition for optimal penalty is the following. 
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The equation above implies that the optimal penalty is defined by the 
responses of polluting firms to the change in the bribe rate, and the 
response of corrupting officials to the penalty. The optimal rate could be 
found by substituting 
p
b


 with the corresponding impact of penalty on the 
optimal behaviour of tax officials. Let 21, pp be the penalty for the corrupt 
tax official under the absence and the presence of financial reward, the 
optimal penalties are the following. 
 
 
 
2
22
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
)()()(
2
b
r
rb
r
r
b
r
re
p
b
r
re
p
bst
re
p
st
b
r
re
PS
t
trb
r
r
p













































































 
         (52) 
 
 62 
 
 
 
2
22
2
2
2
22
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
)()()(
2
b
r
rb
r
r
st
b
r
b
r
re
p
b
r
re
p
bst
re
p
st
b
r
re
PS
t
trb
r
r
p
















































































 
         (53) 
Where 0
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r

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Equation (51) shows that the optimal penalty for corrupting officials is 
increasing with magnitude of the impact on the bribe rate.  If the impact is 
stronger, the optimal penalty can be set at a higher rate.  The optimal 
penalty rate when a financial reward is available (equation 53) could be 
lower than the rate without the financial reward (equation 52). 
The optimal financial reward for the tax officials for revealing the evasion is 
defined by the following condition. 
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The optimal financial reward rate for the officials (η) could be obtained by 
substituting 

b
 with the corresponding impact of financial reward on 
optimal behaviour of the tax official. The optimal reward is given by the 
following condition. 
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Equation (55) indicates that optimal reward for tax officials is increasing with 
the size of the impact on the bribe rate.  If the impact becomes greater, the 
optimal financial reward may increase to reach the optimal payoff for the 
MoF.  The optimal financial reward could be higher than the optimal penalty, 
since the optimal behaviour of the tax officials suggests that the impact of 
financial reward on bribe rate is greater than the impact of the penalty. 
 
 
3.4. CONCLUSION 
This theoretical study is intended to provide the clue regarding the optimal 
emission tax that induces the compliance. The model refers to the work of 
Wilson and Damania (2005) on the interplay between bribery and emission 
tax compliance.  Deviating from the model of Wilson and Damania (2005), 
the model in this study assumes that the emission report is an independent 
decision of the firms instead of being a negotiated agreement between firms 
and government agents. This assumption is consistent with the applied self-
assessment taxation system in Indonesia, which enables the firms to decide 
the level of emission report privately.  This assumption is also relevant to the 
costly monitoring situation, which requires the officials to select the 
submitted reports with higher possibility of inaccuracy before auditing the 
firms. The model extends the study of Wilson and Damania (2005) by 
incorporating financial reward to invoke higher compliance level.  Following 
Swierzbinski (1994), the reward scheme resembles a deposit-refund system, 
where the reward is given after the accuracy of the emission report is 
confirmed.  This theoretical research expands the environmental compliance 
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literatures by examining financial reward and bribery in combination, which 
has never been done in the existing studies.  
The study firstly solves the optimal behaviour regarding the reported 
emission of polluting firms, given a set of policy instruments announced by 
the MoF and the bribe rate determined by tax officials. Different optimal 
conditions for reported emission are developed under different assumptions 
of financial reward availability and the prevalence of bribery.  After the 
optimal decisions of the firms are solved, this study formulates the optimal 
decision of tax officials in determining the bribe rate, given the enforcement 
policies set by the MoF. Optimal decisions of tax officials are constructed 
under different settings regarding the availability of financial reward for 
revealing the tax evasion. Finally, taking into consideration the optimal 
behaviour of both polluting firms and tax officials, the MoF decides the 
optimal enforcement policy. The elements of policy mixture include of the 
sanction for noncompliant firms, financial reward for compliant firms, 
penalty for corrupting tax officials, and financial reward for tax officials to 
reveal the evasion. 
In general, optimal reports of polluting firms are decreasing with the tax rate 
and increasing with sanction, audit probability, financial reward for 
compliance, and bribe. Under the presence of bribery, the optimal reported 
emission of polluting firms is lower than without bribery. The availability of 
financial reward increases the optimal report, although the increase 
becomes smaller when the bribery prevails.  The availability of financial 
reward is also able to mitigate the negative impact of emission tax on 
reported emission. On the other hand, financial reward lessens the impact of 
the sanction and audit probability.   
The highest impact on reported emission under the presence of bribery is 
demonstrated by the bribe, and the second highest impact is given by the 
sanction.  The impact of the sanction is superior to the financial reward in 
increasing the report when the gap between the optimal reported emission 
and the actual emission is wide. 
Contrary to the optimal behaviour of polluting firm, the optimal behaviour of 
a tax official in deciding the bribe rate is more affected by the financial 
reward instead of the penalty.  Furthermore, the availability of financial 
reward for discovering evasion does not crowd out the impact of other 
enforcement instruments. For instance, the impact of the sanction on 
optimal bribe rate remains the same as before and after the introduction of 
financial reward. This difference is stemmed from the difference between 
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the reward disbursement mechanism for the firms and the officials.  In the 
model, compliant firms may only get the reward if they are audited by tax 
officials with a certain probability. On the contrary, officials who are able to 
find the noncompliance may directly propose for financial reward by 
submitting the report of tax evasion to the MoF. 
The MoF should incorporate the optimal behaviour of polluting firms and tax 
officials when deciding the optimal level of policy instruments. The optimal 
tax rate should be balancing the benefit of tax with the cost of enforcement 
and the decline of the environmental gain due to tax evasion. In the case 
where the evasion is high and the capacity of government to disburse the tax 
revenue on the environmental program effectively is limited, the optimal 
emission tax rate will be lower than the Pigovian rate. 
The optimal sanction and financial reward for the polluting firms are defined 
by the optimal response of the firms and the marginal benefit of each 
instrument, consisted of the increase in environmental benefit and reduction 
of enforcement cost due to the increase in reported emission and tax 
payment. Since reported emission is more responsive to the change in 
expected sanction than to the change in expected financial reward, the 
optimal sanction for the noncompliant firm could be higher than the 
compliance reward to maintain the optimal payoff for the MoF. 
The optimal penalty levied and financial reward for the tax officials depends 
on the marginal benefit of each instrument (a higher  environmental benefit 
and a lower enforcement cost as the reported emission increase), optimal 
response of tax officials, and optimal response of polluting firms to the bribe 
rate.  Since the bribe rate is more responsive to the change in financial 
reward than the change of expected penalty, the optimal financial reward for 
revealing the evasion could be higher than the penalty. 
Based on those theoretical findings, the best combination of emission tax 
schemes in the presence of bribery with costly monitoring would be a low 
tax rate with high noncompliance sanction and low financial reward for 
polluting firms, in combination with high financial reward for tax officials 
who are able to discover the evasion and moderate penalty for the corrupt 
tax officials.  
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Chapter 4 
COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR UNDER THE PRESENCE OF BRIBERY:                                       
EXPERIMENTAL SUPPORT FOR EMISSION TAX IN INDONESIA  
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The theoretical approach in the chapter three provides the analysis of the 
optimal emission tax scheme under the presence of bribery.  The theoretical 
method offers a framework to deal with institutional design.  However, 
dealing with institutional setting has to consider the complication of the real 
economic activity. A significant complication appears in the behaviour of the 
real economic agents, which may not be simply driven by utility 
maximization as assumed in the game theoretical approach.  Laboratory 
experiment can provide the information regarding how people will behave 
to the particular economic design, thus, verifies the prediction of theoretical 
approach. In this sense, the laboratory experiment can be considered a 
complement to the theoretical method, to compensate the limitation of 
theoretical results due to the complexity of real economic system (Roth, 
2002). 
Plott (1982) describes the experimental method as an approach to examine 
the human behaviour in the economic decision settings with the 
experiments. This method brings real people into the laboratory (or the 
field) in which they decide real choices and earn or loss financial payoff as 
the consequence of their decision. The main elements of the experiment are 
the environment, the institution, and the incentive. The environment is 
composed of the economic agents (the experimental subjects) with the 
corresponding characteristics such as social values, resources and 
information. The institution consists of the rules that regulate the action 
(and interaction) of the economic agents. The experimental methods allow 
the researcher to control the institutions and incentives faced by the 
subjects to examine the main issues of interest (Alm, 2011). Changing these 
elements in a controlled laboratory setting enables the deduction of the 
determinants of behavioural change. 
A laboratory experiment can be employed to examine a policy design 
without prior empirical information. This approach enables the researcher to 
observe the performance of new institutions and to suggest the 
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improvement based on the observation results (Smith, 2003). This 
characteristic is crucial since it is difficult to obtain the data prior to the 
implementation of the examined policies. For instance, the data of 
compliance as a response to a newly proposed emission taxation scheme is 
impossible to obtain since the response will not be available before the 
reform takes place. On the other hand, the information regarding how the 
regulated subjects will behave under different schemes is important for 
policy purposes. 
According to Alm (2011), another important feature of the experiment is its 
ability to generate the information of individual or group decisions in the 
settings where the institutions and incentives can be manipulated 
independently, in order to investigate the responses to the isolated changes 
in those elements. Therefore, the impact of each determinant can be 
observed in isolation without the influence of compounding factors.  In the 
case of empirical research on emission tax, the compliance of the taxpayers 
given certain policy scheme may be confounded by unidentified factors, 
leading to difficulty in observing the impact of individual determinants 
within the policy mixture. Laboratory experiments may provide a helpful 
solution by enabling the separate impact of each determinant to be 
generated and compared.  
Roth (1987) classifies the objectives of experiment into three broad 
categories. The first category is “Speaking to Theorist”, involving the 
experiments intended to test the well-established theories. The second 
category is “Searching for Facts”, involving the experiments designed to 
observe the impact of the variables of which the existing theory cannot 
provide a profound explanation.  The third category is “Whispering in the 
Ears of Princes”, identifying the experiments motivated by certain policy 
issues of interest. The majority of the experiments have been enlisted in the 
first two categories thus far.  However, currently the experiments are 
gradually employed to inform the policy maker regarding specific subjects of 
relevance (Alm, 2011). 
Referring to the classification of Roth (1987), the experimental study of this 
dissertation could be more suitably grouped within the third category.  This 
study is intended to investigate the compliance behaviour of the regulated 
polluting firms as the response to emission tax schemes under different 
designs. This is important since the implementation of the schemes will have 
significant and irreversible outcomes. 
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In particular, this experimental study aims to compare the compliance 
behaviour and the effect of determinants within the emission tax scheme on 
the compliance behaviour of polluting firms, under different bribery settings. 
Emission tax scheme in this research is a combination of tax rate, sanction 
rate, reward rate, bribe rate, and auditing probability. This experiment sets 
the determinant variables to act independently and simultaneously in 
designed games. This setting enables the observation of the individual effect 
of each determinant while controlling other influential variables. 
The rest of the paper is ordered as follows. The next section following the 
introduction part will present the brief review of experimental literature on 
tax compliance. The method and the conduct of the experiment are 
described afterwards, followed by the section presenting and discussing the 
experimental results. The last section is the conclusion and policy 
recommendation. 
 
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on environmental regulation and enforcement follows from 
the studies on optimal penalties in the law and economics (Polinsky and 
Shavell, 2000). Despite the difference in the intended tax’s objectives, the 
issue of compliance with the emission tax is identical to the problem of 
compliance with the other taxes. The initial literature of tax compliance 
could be traced back to the work of Becker (1968) on the economics of 
crime. In his analysis, criminals are considered rational individuals who seek 
to maximize expected utility. Criminals make an economic decision by 
judging the benefit of the crime against the probability of detection, 
conviction, and punishment.  Increasing the component of detection and 
punishment will reduce the economic reward of the crime. Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) apply the economics of crime approach to taxpayer 
compliance; in which taxpayer is assumed to weigh the potential costs of 
noncompliance against its potential benefits. The costs are a function of 
detection probability and the punishment for underpayment, while the 
benefits are a function of tax rate and income level. The model presents the 
insight that tax evasion is negatively correlated with the tax rate, detection 
probability and severity of punishment.   
The first experimental research on tax compliance by Friedland et al. (1978) 
examine tax evasion behaviour with three explanatory variables: tax rate, 
audit frequency, and magnitude of fine. The experiment reveals a significant 
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increase in probability and occurrence of tax evasion as the tax rate 
increases. They conclude that the tax rate is the most influential determining 
factor for tax evasion. The experimental result also suggests that the 
compliance is more influenced by the magnitude of fine than by audit 
probabilities. The latter result is supported by Park and Hyun (2003) who 
find that the magnitude of fine affects the compliance stronger than the 
probability of audit.  However, Friedland (1982) reports that audit intensity 
affect the compliance more than the severity of the fine. 
Beck et al. (1991) investigate the effects of variations in determinant 
variables, including tax rate, penalty rate, and audit probability on reported 
taxable income. The results support their hypothesis that risk-neutral 
taxpayers will increase their compliant behaviour as the detection 
probability and penalty rate increase.  However, different with the finding of 
Freidland et al. (1978), the tax rate is not found to influence the compliance 
behaviour of taxpayers. Insignificant effect of the tax rate is also found in an 
experiment by Baldry (1987) and a study by Porcano (1988), both 
experiments investigate the self-reported compliance behaviour. 
Alm et al. (1992a) conduct the experiment with declared income as the 
dependent variable and  independent variables employed in their 
experiment are  income, tax rate, fine rate, audit rate, and  public goods (for 
some sessions). The results show that higher tax rates significantly lessen the 
tax compliance.  The fine is also found to deter the evasion, although the 
impact is virtually zero.  Alm et al. (1995) show that fines are only effective in 
combination with high audit frequency. Their experiment suggests that the 
interaction of both variables is more salient than their separate effects. 
A Meta Study by Blackwell (2007) based on twenty laboratory experimental 
studies examines the impacts of conventional economic determinants of tax 
compliance: the tax rate, the penalty rate, and the probability of audit. In 
addition, the study also includes the effect of a public good “return” to tax 
payment. The study finds a strong evidence that increasing the penalty rate, 
audit probability, and marginal-percapita return to the public good positively 
affect the tax compliance, but finds no statistically significant effect of the 
tax rate on the compliance. 
There is a large experimental tax compliance literature, well surveyed by 
Torgler (2002). The survey suggests that while tax rate, auditing, and fines 
affect the compliance, it is also true that social and institutional factors 
systematically matter. Taxpayers may as well be driven by moral rules and 
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sentiments. They might bear moral costs if they do not pay the taxes and act 
as free-riders. 
With regard to the issue of tax compliance and corruption, the analytical 
research of Chander and Wilde (1992) suggests that the expected 
government revenue may be lower in the presence of corrupted officials.  
Moreover, when bribing is allowed and tax evaders are willing to pay the 
bribe, the increase in fines and tax rates may lower the tax returns. A more 
recent experiment by Bilotkach (2006) examines the issue of tax evasion by 
companies through underreporting activity.  He develops the game in which 
a businessman can hide part of his profit and offer a bribe to the official. The 
results reveal that once it becomes known that supervising officials agree to 
accept bribes, participants offer bribes more aggressively and the magnitude 
of underreporting increases. 
The effect of reward on tax compliance has been considered, although the 
experimental study on this topic is still rare. The study of Alm et al. (1992b) 
examines the effects of financial reward on compliance behaviour with 
multiple periods experiment. Compared to a control condition, tax 
compliance is higher in the reward conditions. However, the authors point 
out that the increase in compliance is primarily achieved by extreme tax 
compliance behaviours: it is either fully complying or entirely evading the tax 
obligation.  Torgler (2003) conducts a one-shot experiment with 
professionals from Costa Rica as participants. Tax compliance in this 
experiment is higher when the financial reward is offered for an accurate 
income report. Bazart and Pickhardt (2010) conduct the experiments in 
which the reward is given in the form of a lottery for audited and completely 
honest reports. The results show that the financial reward has a positive 
impact on compliance. However, Kastlunger et al.  (2010) conclude from 
their experiment that providing the reward to the honest taxpayers does not 
generally increase the tax revenue.  They propose that when the chance of 
reward for tax honesty is given, taxpayers seek one of the two goals: either 
they advance for the higher additional income from tax evasion, or they 
proceed toward obtaining the reward by complying with the tax obligation. 
Among those papers on tax compliance, none observes the effect of financial 
reward and the bribery in combination. This study intends to fill that gap. 
Employing experimental method, this study is expected to contribute on 
emission tax literature by examining the role of financial reward on the 
compliance behaviour under the presence of bribery. Furthermore, this 
study also includes the bribe rate (the cost of a bribe) as one of the 
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compliance determinants under the presence of bribery, a variable that has 
not been investigated in the existing experimental literature. 
 
4.3. METHOD 
The experiments are designed to observe the decision behaviour of the 
subjects when the institutional setting and the incentives change.  There are 
several critical conditions of the experimental method as defined by Smith 
(1992). Those conditions include non-satiation, salience, reward dominance, 
privacy, and parallelism. Non-satiation indicates that the subjects prefer a 
bigger reward medium to the smaller one. This condition is necessary for the 
subjects to base their decisions on the relative magnitude of the payoffs. 
Salience means that the rewards received by the subjects are directly 
correlated to their choices so that the subjects are aware that their decisions 
affect their outcomes. Salience is necessary to manipulate the subjects to 
experience the costs and benefits of the decisions, encouraging them to 
consider the profitable decisions in the experiment seriously.   Reward 
dominance suggests that the rewards are large enough to compensate the 
subjective costs or benefits of participating in the experiment. Privacy 
implies that the subjects only know their payoffs and are not aware of 
others. This condition is aimed to isolate the decision of each subject from 
the subjective value of the other subjects’ payoff.  Parallelism indicates that 
the setting of the experiment replicates as much as possible the crucial 
features of the naturally occurring world.  
Along the lines of most laboratory experiments, this study employs 
university students as the participants. A common criticism on laboratory 
experiments with undergraduate students is that they are a very specific 
segment of the population. It raises the issue of population validity, focusing 
on whether or not the decision of the students in the experiment is 
suggestive for the decision of the real economic agents. However, Baldry 
(1987) states that the responses of students are not different with other 
subjects under the same laboratory settings. The reason for this equivalence 
is that the cognitive processes in the experiment are the same between 
subject pools (Alm, 1998).  There are several replications of the experiments, 
which is previously conducted with students, with relevant subjects as the 
participants (managers, traders, and professionals). Despite some observed 
minor differences, these studies reveal that the general patterns of 
behaviour are well corresponding to those of student participants (Krause et 
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al., 2004).  Alm et al. (2010) present the data to demonstrate that the 
experimental responses of students are rarely different from the response of 
other experimental subjects. They conclude that student and non-student 
respond correspondingly as experimental subjects.   
Students have been employed in various experiments to investigate the 
firms’ behaviour. Fehr et al. (1993) in the first experimental study on the 
existence of wage exchanges employ students in their research to imitate the 
interaction between firms and workers.  Other researches on wage contracts 
from Fehr and Gächter (2000), Fehr and Falk (1999, 2003), and Brandts and 
Charness (2004) also use students to assume the role of firms. Students are 
also recruited as subjects in the experiments on firms’ behaviour in the 
oligopolistic setting (Le Coq and Orzen, 2006; Morgan et al., 2006; and 
Orzen, 2008).  
The laboratory experiment is often criticized as being an oversimplification, 
and more effort needs to be made to minimize the gap between the 
experimental design and the particular environment of interest (Krause et 
al., 2004). Torgler (2002) and Richardson (2008) have indicated that the tax 
compliance varies across countries with different culture, suggesting that the 
experiment cannot ignore the importance of the environment in which the 
experiment is conducted. Therefore, to diminish the distance between the 
experimental settings and the real environment of interest, the experiment 
is conducted in Indonesia since it is expected to calibrate the taxation 
situation in the respective country.  
The participants are recruited from senior undergraduate students of Faculty 
of Economics, from Diponegoro University, Indonesia, mostly those who are 
in their third year of study. Economics students are chosen because they are 
expected to play the game in which they represent the businessmen who 
should make an economic decision, given the instruments indicated in 
economics terms. Although the game could also be played by other subjects, 
it is easier to explain the procedure of the experiment to participants who 
have been familiar with the employed terminology. Recruitment is made by 
printing the announcement, and students interested to join are registered. 
Participants are assigned into different treatment groups randomly from the 
pool of applicants. The participants do not know the description of the 
experiment in advance. They are only aware that they are recruited to 
participate in a game on economic decision making. This procedure helps to 
eliminate the problem of self-selection bias. Upon arrival in the lab, the 
participants are given a printed instruction containing the rules of the 
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experiments. Preparing the printed instruction of the game also ensures that 
the experiment could be replicated in a comparable way. 
The participants are paid according to their decisions during the experiment. 
In line with the principles of salience and reward dominance, the subjects 
are paid according to their decisions during the experiment with a significant 
monetary reward to invoke their economic motive. The privacy principle is 
established by prohibiting the subjects to communicate in any possible way 
once the experiment has commenced. Following the standard procedures 
(see Alm, 2011), the experiments in this study are administered in a 
consistent manner to allow replicability. The experiments are also set as 
simple as possible, avoiding unnecessary complications, to prevent the 
subjects becoming confused. The instructions of the experiments are 
prepared in an understandable way to the subjects, avoiding the use of 
examples that may lead the subjects to fix on certain mental images that 
could mislead their decision. 
 
4.3.1. Experimental design 
4.3.1.1. The model 
The experiment aims to understand the implication of enforcement 
parameters on compliance behaviour of the firms, under the 
implementation of reward and the presence of bribery. The experiment is 
divided into four models. The first two models represent clean taxation 
setting without the practice of bribery, while the other two models indicate 
the taxation situation afflicted with bribery. In each setting, the first model 
only employs conventional fiscal instruments such as the tax rate, probability 
of audit, and sanction rate, and the other model will introduce the reward 
rate as an additional fiscal instrument to influence the compliance behaviour 
of the firms. The models under the presence of bribery include the bribe 
rate as the additional determinant of compliance behaviour.  The 
classification of the models is presented in the table below. 
 
Table 4.1 
Classification of experimental models   
 
 No reward With reward 
No bribery Model 1 Model 2 
With bribery Model 3 Model 4 
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Model 1 is the basic model that simulates the taxation condition under the 
absence of bribery when the reward for telling the truth is not available.  The 
firms generate the income which is assumed to be linearly correlated with 
the discharged emission and pay the emission tax based on the voluntary 
reported emission. The firms face the probability of audit, and the detected 
cheating firms should pay the sanction on the unpaid tax.  Three parameters 
that affect the behaviour of tax compliance in this model are tax rate, 
probability of audit, and sanction rate. 
 
  Str    
         (1) 
Where  restS   
 
The payoff of the firms (ψ) is the income associated with emission (π) less 
the tax payment (tr), where t is a tax rate and r is the amount of income they 
report voluntarily. If during the auditing they are detected cheating, their 
income will be further reduced by the sanction (S) proportional to the size of 
the unpaid emission tax (t(e-r)). e is the actual emission and the gap 
between actual and reported income (e-r) represents the size of evasion. The 
amount of sanction is given by st(e-r), where s is a sanction rate. The 
probability of getting audited is indicated by  .  
Financial reward as an additional determinant of compliance behaviour is 
introduced in model 2. This model represents the situation in the absence of 
bribery where the reward is given to the compliant firms who report the 
accurate amount of emission, after the reports are checked. In this 
treatment, the firms are not only punished for cheating, but they are also 
encouraged to report truthfully by providing them the financial reward to do 
so. The determinant parameters used in this model are tax rate, probability 
of audit, sanction rate, and reward rate.   
 
  IStr    
         (2) 
Where )( restS   and iteI   
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Similar to the first model, the basic payoff of the firms is the income 
associated with discharged emission less the emission tax payment. Their 
income will be deducted further by a certain amount of sanction if they are 
caught cheating. However, if they are verified to submit the accurate report, 
they will be given a financial reward, I. I is defined by i t e, where i is the 
financial reward rate. The amount of the reward is proportional to the 
amount of the accurate tax payment.    is a choice parameter with the 
value of 1 if the firms are compliant and  reporting the true amount of 
emission.  
Model 3 imitates the situation where the bribery exists, while the reward for 
reporting the true level of emission is not available. This model closely 
represents the current taxation situation in Indonesia, where the bribery is 
common and the government does not provide a financial reward for the 
firms for submitting accurate reports. Bribery provides the option for 
noncompliant firms to choose between paying the penalty and paying bribe 
to avoid the sanction. The bribe is designed to be lower than the sanction, 
matching the real-life situation. The determinant parameters in this 
treatment are tax rate, probability of audit, sanction rate, and bribe rate.  
The bribe rate is introduced in this treatment to indicate the bribing price 
that has to be paid by the firms. 
 
  SBtr )1(    
         (3) 
Where )( restS   and  rebstB   
 
The payoff is closely similar to the model 1. However, instead of being 
charged to pay the sanction, the detected cheating firms are offered the 
option to pay the bribe. The bribe is proportional to the amount of the 
sanction. It is defined by  rebst  , where b is the bribe rate as a 
percentage of the sanction.  β is a choice parameter of which the value is 
one if the firms decide to pay the bribe.  
Model 4 is the most complex model, in which all determinants used in the 
preceding three models are employed. Apart from the traditional parameter 
such as the tax rate, probability of audit, and sanction rate, the reward rate 
and bribe rate are also incorporated in the model. This model indicates the 
situation under the presence of bribery, where the reward for reporting 
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truthfully is available.  Being allowed to bribe for evading the sanction, the 
firms will be inclined to cheat instead of reporting honestly. However, when 
the reward is offered, they should make a choice between the benefit of 
cheating and the benefit of reporting truthfully.  The payoff is indicated by 
equation (4). 
 
    ISBtr   1  
         (4)   
Where )( restS  ,  rebstB  , and iteI   
 
α and β are the choice parameters. The value of α is 1 if the firms decide to 
report the true level of emission.  β indicates the decision of cheating the 
firms,  of which the value is 1 if the cheating firms prefer to pay the bribe 
instead of the sanction.  
4.3.1.2. The operationalization of experiment 
This experiment is designed to be simple enough without losing the basic 
features of a real situation intended to be calibrated. This experiment 
assumes that the emission is constant and the main concern of the firms is 
to decide the level of emission that should be reported. The experiment 
examines the compliance behaviour of the experimental subjects within four 
different treatments. Each treatment is based on the respective setting 
formulated in the model.  For the sake of simplicity, the emission in the 
model is replaced by the money income in the experiment.  
Treatment 1 is constructed based on the model in the equation (1) when the 
bribery and the financial reward are absent. The choice variable that should 
be decided in treatment 1 is the reported income. The constant variable, the 
variable that is kept constant during the experiment, is the fixed income. The 
treatment variables, variables controlled by the experimenter and changed 
over time (round) to check the response of the subjects, are tax rate, 
sanction rate, and probability of audit. Given the value of constant variable 
and treatment variables, the subjects should make a decision regarding the 
amount of income that they intend to report. 
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Figure  4.1 
Sequence of actions in treatment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sequence of actions in treatment 1 is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Firstly the 
subjects decide the amount of income that they are willing to report, given 
different values of the treatment variables. Reporting the true amount of 
money means complying, while reporting less than the received money is 
considered cheating. After the subjects submit the reported income, their 
income will be deducted by the amount of tax proportional to their reported 
income.  The report will be audited with a certain probability. The subjects 
who are found cheating will be punished by subtracting the amount of 
money equivalent to the sanction from their income.  
In the treatment 2, the reward is given to the honest subjects after their 
report is checked. The subjects decide the amount of reported income given 
the value of the tax rate, sanction rate, reward rate, and probability of audit.  
The sequence of action in treatment 2 is shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The subject 
pays the tax 
Audit with 
probability 
Cheating subject 
pays the sanction 
The subject 
report the 
income 
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Figure 4.2 
Sequence of actions in treatment 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After the subjects decide their reported amount and submit the report, they 
will be audited with a certain probability.  The audited subjects will have two 
possible outcomes. Their income will be reduced by the certain amount of 
the sanction if they send an incorrect report, or increased by a certain 
amount of reward if they submit a true report.  
The treatment 3 calibrates the situation afflicted with bribery while the 
financial reward for compliance is not available. The treatment variables that 
should be considered in making report decision are tax rate, sanction rate, 
bribe rate, and probability of audit. The sequence of actions in treatment 3 is 
illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 
Sequence of actions in treatment 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Audit with 
probability 
Honest subject is 
rewarded  
Cheating subject 
pays the sanction 
 
The subject 
reports the 
income 
The subject 
pays the tax 
Audit with 
probability 
Cheating subject 
pays the sanction  
Cheating subject 
pays the bribe  
The subject 
pays the tax 
The subject 
reports the 
income 
Or 
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In the treatment 3, the cheating subjects who get audited will be provided 
with two options, charged with the sanction or paying the bribe which is less 
than the sanction. On the other hand, the outcome of the honest subjects 
will be indifferent whether they are audited or not.  
Treatment 4 replicates the situation when the bribery exists and the 
government tries to encourage the compliance by providing the financial 
reward for the compliance. The choice variable that should be decided by 
the subjects is the reported income. Treatment variables are tax rate, 
sanction rate, bribe rate, reward rate, and probability of audit. The sequence 
of actions is presented in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4 
Sequence of actions in treatment 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The design is similar to the treatment 3. However, in this treatment the 
subjects will get the reward once the auditing process confirms the accuracy 
of their reports. In treatment 4, the experimental subjects are not only 
obliged to pay the cost of cheating (in terms of sanction or bribing costs) but 
also eligible to receive the reward after their report is checked.  
The game in all treatment groups consists of 24 rounds, during which the 
subjects are given fixed income in each round. The subjects start their 
decision making in each round with the identical income, and they should 
The subject 
pays the tax 
Honest subject is 
rewarded   
Cheating subject 
pays the sanction 
Cheating subject 
pays the bribe  
The subjects 
reports the 
income 
Audit with 
probability 
Or 
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decide the amount of the reported income given the changing value of 
treatment variables.  The list of the variables is presented below. 
 
Table 4.2 
The experimental variables  
 
Variables  
Treatment 
1 
Treatment 
2 
Treatment 
3 
Treatment 
4 
Choice variable 
  Reported income 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
Treatment variable 
  Tax rate 
  Sanction rate  
  Reward rate 
  Probability of audit 
  Bribe rate 
 
√ 
√ 
- 
√ 
- 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
- 
 
√ 
√ 
- 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
Constant variable 
  Fixed income 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 
The values of treatment variables for all treatments are measured in 
percentage, ranging from low, moderately high, and extremely high. During 
the experiment, the value of treatment variables is randomly picked up so 
that the different combination of determinant values occurs in each round. 
The gap between the value of variables is set distinctly wide so that the 
difference is noticeable to the subjects. 
 
Table 4.3 
Values of treatment variables 
 
Treatment 
variables 
Value 
   
  Tax rate 
  Sanction rate  
  Reward rate 
  Probability of audit 
  Bribe rate 
 
 
5%, 40%, 80% (of the reported income) 
105%, 140%, 180% (of the unpaid tax) 
5%, 40%, 80% (of the paid tax) 
5%, 40%, 80% 
5%, 40%, 80% (of the sanction) 
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The values of all treatment variables, except sanction rate, are set to 5%, 
40%, and 80%. The values of the sanction rate are higher than 100%, 
indicating that the subjects who get the penalty should firstly pay the unpaid 
tax, and then pay the amount proportional to the unpaid tax as the 
punishment. One of the three stated values is picked up randomly before the 
experiment; therefore, there is a different combination of treatment 
variable’s value in each round.  The calculation of treatment variables in 
terms of monetary units is presented below. 
 
Table 4.4 
The calculation of the monetary value of treatment variables 
 
 
Treatment 
variables 
 
 
Base of calculation  
 
Tax 
Sanction 
Financial reward 
Bribe 
 
 
(tax rate) x (reported income) 
(sanction rate) x (tax rate) x (real income – reported income) 
(reward rate) x (tax rate) x (real income = reported income) 
(bribe rate) x (sanction rate) x (real income – reported income) 
 
 
 
The calculation is set to mimic the calculation of those instruments in the 
real situation.  Although the calculation indicates that one percent change in 
sanction rate would yield a smaller change in the payoff than the same 
percentage change in the tax rate, it cannot be simply interpreted that the 
subjects will react to one percent increase in sanction rate in a lower 
reported income than the same percentage of the tax rate.  The implication 
of each instrument on compliance behaviour should be investigated 
statistically using the econometric method.  
Before the experiment is conducted, the participants are asked to fill in a 
simple questionnaire regarding risk attitude. The questionnaire consists of 
the questions assessing the perception of participants regarding certain 
statements. The available choices are ordered using the Likert Scale. The 
questionnaire mainly refers to the risk characteristic assessment using by 
financial investment companies. Since the risk attitude of each subject is 
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varied, the data of risk attitude will be helpful to explain the individual 
decisions of the subjects during the estimation of experimental results.     
4.3.1.3. Data analysis  
Random selection yielded various combinations of treatment values for each 
round in all the treatments. Each combination resulted in a different optimal 
reported income that would give the subjects a maximum payoff.  After the 
data from the experiment is collected, the optimal and the actual reported 
income will be compared to see whether the decisions of the subjects follow 
the optimal choice.  
The compliance behaviour of the subjects among four different treatments is 
compared using the t-test. The t-test is a statistical method to examine the 
mean differences between two groups. T-test may also compare the 
proportions of binary variable, given that the mean value of the binary 
variable is substantively meaningful (Park, 2009).  
Standard econometric techniques are used to analyse the determinants of 
compliance behaviour. The proxies of compliance are regressed on 
determinant variables using panel data regression.  The repetition of games 
in each treatment provides the panel dataset, where the participants’ 
decision responding to the changing values of determinant variables are 
observed over time. Panel data allow controlling variables that change over 
time but not across participants (treatment variables that are determined by 
the experimenter); and a variable which is different from participant to 
participant but does not change over time (risk attitude of participants).  
The random effect model is preferred to analyse the panel dataset resulted 
from the experiment. The argumentation behind the random effect model is 
that the variation among participant is assumed to be random and 
uncorrelated with the value of determinant variables included in the model. 
This assumption is justified since the value of determinant variables over 
time is selected randomly by the experimenter, independent of the attribute 
of participants. Random effect is also preferable if the differences in 
participants’ characteristics (risk attitude) are assumed to influence their 
decisions. The random effect model assumes that the error term of cross-
sectional unit in the model is not correlated with the independent variables, 
therefore, allowing the time-invariant variables to be used as explanatory 
variables (Dougherty, 2006).  
However, the choice of the random effect model should be justified by 
statistical procedures. Following standard procedure on panel data 
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regression, the analysis on panel dataset will use Hausman test to select 
between random effect and the fixed effect model. The Hausman test checks 
whether there is a significant correlation between the unobserved 
characteristics of cross-sectional unit and the regressor.   If the presence of 
correlation is rejected, the random effect model is more powerful and 
efficient. However, if the significance of the correlation is confirmed, then 
the random effect model will be inconsistent and the fixed effect model 
should be chosen (Greene, 2002). 
 
4.4. THE CONDUCT OF THE EXPERIMENT 
The experiment took place in the Faculty of Economics, Diponegoro 
University, Indonesia. Four games (treatments) were run on four different 
days on 20th, 21st, 27th, and 28th of October 2010.  Each treatment consisted 
of two sessions and each session had 24 rounds and took two hours to 
complete. The combinations of treatments' value were randomly ordered for 
all games. Each session was expected to be played by a group of 15 students, 
so that 30 students were involved in each treatment.  The subjects were 
assigned to each treatment group randomly.  However, three students who 
should be participating in treatment 1, 2, and 4 cancelled their participation 
just before the experiment begun. Therefore, these three treatments were 
played with 29 students in total. Since the experiments were dealing with 
simple income calculation, calculators were provided to each subject during 
the experiment to assist the calculations. Prior to the experiment, the 
subjects were asked to fill the simple questionnaire regarding the financial 
risk preference, to capture the possibility that risk attitude of subjects 
affected their compliance behaviour. 
In the experiment, the real economic terms were used to identify the 
treatment variables.  Therefore, the treatment variables were named as tax, 
sanction, financial reward, audit probability, and bribe. Contrary to the 
procedure proposed by Alm (2011) which suggested the use of neutral words 
in describing the rule and treatment variables during laboratory experiment, 
the real economic terms were used in the experiment to build a direct 
reference to the real economic phenomena. The real economic terms was 
expected to encompass the subjective perception of the subjects, the 
perception influenced by the surrounding social context that was unique to 
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each different environment11. Given an identical treatment in the 
experiment, this dissimilarity might create different responses from the 
subjects with different social contexts.  
At the beginning of the experiment, the instructions of the game were read 
to the subjects. The instructions were also printed and handed out to 
subjects to provide them with a better comprehension about the game’s 
rules. Subjects were informed that they would receive a certain amount of 
money as a fixed income in each round. The fixed income was always 
identical in each round, and their decision should be based on the single 
income given in a particular round (as opposite to the accumulated income).  
Subjects were required to report the amount of income they received in 
each round. As the consequence of receiving money, subjects were obliged 
to pay the laboratory tax, which was calculated as a percentage of the 
voluntarily reported income.  Subjects were notified that the size of the tax 
that would be deducted from their income depend on how much money 
they declared in the report.  
The subjects were informed that it was impossible to check the accuracy of 
their report during the experiment, due to limitation of time availability. 
Therefore, the experimenter would only review the selected reports 
randomly. If the audited reported incomes that were incorrect, the sanction 
would be imposed and translated into a further reduction of the subjects’ 
income. The subjects were told that they were prohibited from making any 
communication during the game.  All subjects were given the identity 
number written on the card which was distributed randomly.  The identity 
number was used in substitution for their real identity during the 
experiment.  
In the treatment 1, subjects were given an envelope containing the income 
card, with the real monetary value that has been decided by the 
experimenter, reported income card, and announcement card.  The reported 
income card provided the space in which they could write any amount of 
income that they want to report. Their reported income would be the base 
to decide the amount of money that would be drawn from them. The 
information with respect to treatment variables was written in the 
announcement card.  
                                            
11 For instance, the subjective perception of the subjects in Germany of the word sanction 
and bribe might be different with the subjects in Indonesia. 
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The income card, reported income card, and announcement card were 
submitted in the same envelope. The envelope would be opened during the 
experiment only if it was selected (based on certain probability) to be 
checked. Once they were found cheating, they would be given the sanction 
card in the next round.  The card charged them with the penalty in the real 
monetary unit that would be deducted from their income.  
The reward was introduced during treatment 2, and the value of the reward 
rate was written in the announcement card. After the subjects had written 
the reported income, all the cards were collected in the same envelope. 
Several envelopes were checked according to the decided probability of 
audit. The cheating subjects were handed sanction cards in the next round, 
while the subjects who wrote the right amount of received income were 
awarded the reward card in the next round.  The reward card stated the 
amount of real money that would be added to their income.  
Treatment 3 calibrated the situation where the bribery practice existed.  The 
instruction, which was read and handed over to subjects, clearly stated that 
the cheating subjects who were caught might pay the bribe in exchange of 
the sanction. The amount of the bribe was determined by the 
experimenter12.  The value of the bribe rate was printed on the 
announcement card.   
After subjects made the decision and all the cards were collected, the 
auditing was conducted. The cheating subjects were given the sanction cards 
in the next round. However, differently to the sanction cards in the previous 
two treatments, the card in treatment 3 was not only displaying the amount 
of money that would be deducted from the subjects as the sanction, but also 
offering them the amount of bribe they might pay to avoid the sanction. The 
subjects could pick the amount of money that would be subtracted from 
their income by checking the sanction or bribe option.  
Treatment 4 was simply the combination of treatment 2 and treatment 3, 
the treatment that represented the situation where the bribery was 
practiced, and reward for submitting the true report was implemented. The 
treatment variables were tax rate, sanction rate, reward rate, bribe rate, and 
probability of audit. The values of all treatment variables were given in the 
announcement card. Following the auditing process, after all envelopes were 
                                            
12 It replicated the real situation in which the tax officer had more bargaining power to 
impose the price of the bribe, and the companies should comply with their bargain, as 
implied by the findings of in-depth interview in chapter two.
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collected, subjects who submit the right amount of received income were 
awarded a reward card in the next round and the cheating subject would be 
given the sanction card with the option of bribing. 
 
4.5. RESULTS 
4.5.1 Comparison of optimal and actual reported income 
Random selection yielded various combinations of treatment values for each 
round in all treatments. Each combination resulted in different optimal 
reported income that would give the subjects maximum payoff. This section 
presents the comparison of optimal and actual reported income submitted 
by subjects. Since the payoff function is shaped in the linear form, the 
optimal report should be either zero or the full amount of the received 
income.  
The Figure 4.5 shows the comparison between the optimal report and 
average actual report in treatment 1, for each combination values of 
treatment variables. The y axis represents the average reported income in 
the monetary unit, and the x axis represents the randomly generated 
combinations of each round. All combinations are sorted first by the 
probability of audit, followed by the sanction rate and tax rate. 
 
Figure 4.5 
Optimal and actual report in treatment 1 
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Seventeen out of twenty-four combinations yielded the optimal report of 
zero amount, while the rest combinations suggested a full income report. 
However, the average reports in each round during the experiment were 
higher than zero (when the optimal decision indicated a zero report) and less 
than the full income (when the optimal decision suggested a complete 
report). Although the average actual reports did not fit the optimal 
prediction, the pattern went along with the optimal report.  It can be seen 
from the figure that the highest actual reports were made when the 
combination values suggested reporting the whole income.  
The comparison between the optimal and actual report in treatment 2 is 
illustrated in Figure 4.6. The combination of treatment variables' values is 
ordered by the probability of audit, followed by sanction rate, tax rate, and 
reward rate. Twenty out of twenty-four combinations imply that the optimal 
report is zero. Similar to the result of treatment 1, the average reported in 
the treatment 2 were also higher than zero. The figure also suggests that the 
pattern of the actual report in average follows the tendency of the optimal 
decision. The optimal report and the actual report were converged at the 
combination point that provided the highest payoff by reporting the true 
amount of the received income. 
 
Figure 4.6 
Optimal and actual report in treatment 2 
 
 
 
The arbitrarily generated combination of treatment variables' values in 
treatment 3 is ordered by the probability of audit, followed by sanction rate, 
tax rate, and bribe rate. Only one out of twenty-four combinations suggests 
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that maximum payoff will be obtained by submitting the full report. 
However, as demonstrated in the Figure 4.7, the average reported incomes 
were higher than zero but less than the complete amount of the received 
income. 
 
Figure 4.7 
Optimal and actual report in treatment 3 
 
 
 
The combination of treatment variables' values in treatment 3 is ordered by 
the probability of audit, followed by sanction rate, tax rate, bribe rate, and 
financial reward rate. Similar to the treatment 3, only one of all 
combinations indicates a maximum payoff by reporting the whole amount of 
received income. 
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Figure 4.8 
Optimal and actual report in treatment 4 
 
 
 
Although almost all combinations suggested the optimal value of zero report 
(only one combination implied the opposite), again the average actual 
reports were higher than zero. The trend of the actual report in treatment 4 
also followed the pattern of the optimal report; in fact, the highest actual 
report was made when the optimal decision was submitting the true report.  
4.5.2 Comparison of compliance behaviour among treatments  
Compliance behaviour was measured by the average percentage of reported 
income and the percentage of complying decision during the experiment. In 
treatment 1, the mean of reported income was 58%, indicating that the 
subjects only reported 58% of their received income. The percentage of 
complying decision was 32%, meaning that only 32% of total observations 
were submitting the accurate report.  When the reward was introduced in 
treatment 2, mean reported income increased to 80% and compliance 
increased to 72%.  Under the circumstance where bribery did not exist, the 
introduction of reward was clearly inclined to increase the complying 
decision. 
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Figure 4.9 
Compliance behavior of subjects by treatment 
 
 
Treatment 3 and 4 were set to simulate the situation where bribery practice 
existed, and bribe rate was added as a treatment variable. The complying 
decision under treatment 3, where there was no reward for compliance and 
subjects are given the choice to bribe, was slightly lower than the 
compliance behaviour in treatment 1, which had the same treatments but 
without the bribery. The mean of reported income was lower (54%) while 
The percentage of compliance was equal (32%).  When the reward was 
introduced under treatment 4, the mean reported income increased to 59% 
while the percentage of compliance increased to 45%. It indicated that under 
the bribery setting, the introduction of reward only vaguely increased the 
reported income. On the other hand, it increased the complying decision in a 
more considerable size (although it is still lower than the compliance when 
bribery was prevented).  
Comparing the compliance behaviour under the absence and the presence 
of bribery reveals the fact that when a financial reward was unavailable, the 
complying decision of the subjects was similar. When the financial reward 
was introduced, subjects in the different bribery settings acted differently. 
The introduction of the financial reward increased the level of compliance of 
subjects when bribery was absent. However, when the cheating subjects 
were allowed to bribe, the positive impact of financial reward was reduced.  
At this stage, it is still unknown whether the difference of complying decision 
among different treatments was indeed significant, or it was simply due to 
random chance. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct the mean-difference 
t-test.  The t-test examines the probability that the difference between the 
 91 
 
two means is caused by chance. If the difference is statistically significant, it 
is safe to say that the difference across groups is not caused by random 
chance.   
Prior to the t-test, the equality of variance between paired groups should be 
tested. The Bartlett’s test was used to test if two treatment groups have 
equal variances. It is a chi-square statistic with (k-1) degrees of freedom, 
where k is the number of categories in the independent variable. It tests the 
null hypothesis that the variance of compared groups is equal. If the chi-
square is statistically significant, the variances across groups are unequal. 
Therefore, Welch’s t-test should be used to test the mean-difference instead 
of Student’s t-test (Sawilowsky, 2002). 
 
Table 4.5 
Test of mean-difference of reported income 
 
Group t-test 
 
1 and 2 -10.13** 
(0.00) 
1 and 3 0.51 
(0.13) 
2 and 4 9.43** 
(0.00) 
3 and 4 -1.94 
(0.06) 
  
Note: *   significant at 5% significance level  
          ** significant at 1% significance level 
         Value in the bracket is P-value 
 
Table 4.5 shows the difference of mean of reported income and percentage 
of compliance among all treatment groups. The difference of reported 
income between treatment 1 and 2 were significant, so was the difference 
between treatment 2 and 4. On the contrary, the difference of reported 
income between treatment 1 and 3 was not significant, and neither was the 
difference between the treatment 3 and 4.  
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Table 4.6 
Test of mean-difference of percentage of compliance 
 
Group t-test 
 
1 and 2 -15.73** 
(0.00) 
1 and 3 0.23 
(0.81) 
2 and 4 10.30** 
(0.00) 
3 and 4 -5.19** 
(0.00) 
 
Note: *   significant at 5% significance level  
          ** significant at 1% significance level 
         Value in the bracket is P-value 
 
The results of mean-difference test on the percentage of compliance are 
presented in the Table 4.6. The difference of the complying decision due to 
the implementation of financial reward was significant, under the absence 
and the presence of bribery practice (treatment 1 against 2, and treatment 3 
against 4). The difference between the treatments with the financial reward 
before and after the introduction of bribery (treatment 2 and 4) was also 
significant. On the other hand, the complying decision of subjects in the 
absence and the presence of bribery were not significantly different before 
and after the introduction of financial reward.    
4.5.3 Determinants of compliance behaviour 
This study models the compliance behaviour as a function of treatment 
variables such as the tax rate, sanction rate, reward rate, bribe rate, 
probability of audit, and risk.  The compliance is approached using two 
proxies. The first proxy of compliance was reported income. The use of 
reported income was expected to give the information regarding the degree 
of compliance, where a bigger amount of reported income is assumed to 
indicate higher compliance level. The second proxy of compliance used in 
this experiment was complying decision. Complying in this research was 
interpreted as the action where the subjects reported the actual received 
income.  It could provide information regarding absolute compliance, which 
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was consisted of only two dichotomous values, cheating or complying. 
Subjects were only considered complying if they reported the full amount of 
received income.  
Reported income was regressed on determinant variables using the panel 
data regression approach. The first step in the analysis is choosing a 
preferable method between the random effect and the fixed effect 
approach. The Hausman test is used to test whether the unique errors are 
correlated with the independent variables. The Hausman test on the 
regression models revealed that the null hypothesis, from which the errors 
were uncorrelated, was not rejected.  Therefore, the random effect was 
more preferable than the alternative fixed effect.  The econometric results 
are presented in the table below. 
 
Table 4.7 
Determinants of reported income 
 
Determinant 
of reported 
income 
Treatment 
1 
(R2: 0.18) 
Treatment 
2 
(R2: 0.11) 
Treatment 
3 
(R2: 0.17) 
Treatment 
4 
(R2: 0.15) 
Tax rate 0.03 
(0.47) 
0.03 
(0.47) 
-0.37** 
(0.00) 
-0.15** 
(0.00) 
Sanction 
rate 
0.09* 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.67) 
0.10* 
(0.02) 
0.11** 
(0.01) 
Financial 
reward rate 
n.a -0.04 
(0.39) 
n.a 0.07 
(0.12) 
Bribe rate n.a n.a 0.15** 
(0.00) 
0.10* 
(0.03) 
Audit 
probability 
0.51** 
(0.00) 
0.41** 
(0.00) 
0.37** 
(0.00) 
0.53** 
(0.00) 
Risk -0.02 
(0.69) 
0.00 
(0.99) 
-0.02 
(0.69) 
-0.04 
(0.40) 
Note: *   significant at 5% significance level  
           ** significant at 1% significance level 
           The value in the bracket is P-value 
 
The coefficients in the table represent the percentage of change in reported 
income as one unit change in determinant variables. During all treatments, 
the risk characteristic of subjects does not have a significant impact on their 
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decision in deciding the amount of reported income, although the sign of the 
coefficient is correct. The signs of the risk coefficient show that the reported 
income will be lower for the more risk-seeking subjects.  
In treatment 1, the determinant variables that significantly affect the 
reported income during the experiment are sanction rate and audit 
probability. Those variables are significant at 5% and 1% significance level 
respectively. One unit change in sanction rate will increase the reported 
income by 9% of the actual income. Audit probability demonstrates a greater 
impact on reported income, where one unit change will lead to 51% increase 
in reported income. On the other hand, the tax rate is not affecting the 
decision of subjects in reporting their income.  
The only significant determinant in treatment 2 is the audit probability 
(significant at 1% significance level), implying that one unit change in 
probability of the audit will increase the reported income by 41% of the 
received income.  Other variables do not significantly affect the decision of 
subjects. The financial reward rate, the additional instrument to enhance the 
compliance, is also insignificant.  
The impact of the tax rate in treatment 3 and 4, where the bribery practice is 
introduced into the experiment, is significant at 1% level of significance. In 
the treatment 3, one unit increase in the tax rate will reduce the reported 
income by 37%. When the financial reward is introduced into treatment 4, 
the size of reduction due to one unit increase in the tax rate falls to 15% of 
actual income. Sanction rate and audit probability show the significant 
influence on the decision of subjects in treatment 3 and 4. Both variables are 
significant at 1% significance level. One unit increase in the sanction rate 
lead to 10% increase of reported income in treatment 3 and 11% increase in 
treatment 4, while one unit increase in audit probability raises the reported 
income by 37% in treatment 3 and 53% in treatment 4.  
Bribe rate, the additional determinant variable of compliance under the 
presence of bribery, also shows the significant impact on reported income at 
1% and 5% level of significance in treatment 3 and 4 respectively. One unit 
increase in the bribe rate raises the report in the treatment 3 by 15% of the 
actual income.   
In treatment 4, the rise in the bribe rate is 10% of the actual income. The 
results indicate that the probability of audit has the most important role in 
determining reported income of subjects in all treatments. It is constantly 
significant at 1% significance level across all treatment groups. Sanction rate 
is also significant in all the treatment groups, except in treatment 2 where 
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the financial reward is offered to subjects who have proven to submit the 
true amount of received income. Tax rate, which does not have a statistically 
significant effect on reported income in treatment 1 and 2, has a negative 
impact on reported income when bribery is practiced in treatment 3 and 4 at 
1% level of significance.  The coefficient, which indicates the size of the 
impact, is bigger than the coefficient of the sanction rate. Bribe rate, as an 
addition to the conventional determinant of compliance, is significant under 
the presence of bribery. However, the financial reward rate as another 
alternative determinant of compliance is not significant in any treatment 
group; both in the absence and the presence of bribery.  
Since the impact of financial reward is the topic of interest in this study, it is 
necessary to see whether the availability of financial reward (as opposed to 
the size of the reward) will make a difference in the reported income.  
Therefore, financial reward is translated into the dummy variable consisting 
of binary values. Zero value represents the condition without the financial 
reward, and 1 if the financial reward is available. The financial reward 
dummy is regressed on reported income, together with other controlled 
variables.   
 
Table 4.8 
Determinants of reported income with financial reward dummy 
Determinant 
of reported 
income 
Treatment without 
bribery 
(R2: 0.21) 
Treatment with 
bribery 
(R2: 0.17) 
Tax rate 0.02 
(0.33) 
-0.25** 
(0.00) 
Sanction 
rate 
0.07** 
(0.00) 
0.12** 
(0.00) 
Bribe rate n.a 0.13** 
(0.00) 
Probability 
of audit 
0.46** 
(0.00) 
0.44** 
(0.00) 
Risk -0.01 
(0.79) 
-0.03 
(0.36) 
Reward 
dummy 
0.22** 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.49) 
Note: *   significant at 5% significance level  
           ** significant at 1% significance level 
           The value in the bracket is P-value 
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The result presented in Table 4.8 show that financial reward dummy is 
statistically significant in influencing the reported income when bribery is 
not practiced. The introduction of the financial reward will increase the 
reported income under the absence of bribery by 22% of the received 
income. The significance of the financial reward dummy might explain why 
the financial reward rate does not affect the reported income in treatment 2.  
Subjects are more motivated by the presence of financial reward instead of 
the size of the reward. Provided that the reward is available, they will be 
more compliant regardless the amount of the reward. However, when the 
bribery practice is introduced, financial reward becomes insignificant. It 
indicates that the introduction of financial reward for compliance is only 
effective in affecting the reported income in the absence of bribery.  
The second proxy of compliance used in this experiment was the complying 
decision. Compliance was defined as the action where the subjects reported 
the true amount of the received income. Complying decision as a binary 
variable was regressed on determinant variables using the Panel Logistic 
Regression approach. The regression results are presented in the Table 4.9 
below. 
 
Table 4.9 
Determinants of complying decision 
Determinant 
of complying 
Treatment 
1 
 
Treatmen
t 2 
 
Treatment 
3 
 
Treatmen
t 4 
 
Tax rate 
0.96 
(0.91) 
1.46 
(0.37) 
0.04** 
(0.00) 
0.26** 
(0.00) 
Sanction 
rate 
2.59** 
(0.01) 
1.26 
(0.63) 
3.73** 
(0.00) 
2.72** 
(0.00) 
Reward rate n.a 
0.79 
(0.62) 
n.a 
1.66 
(0.13) 
Bribe rate n.a n.a 
6.39** 
(0.00) 
1.96* 
(0.05) 
Probability 
of audit 
19.56** 
(0.00) 
42.44** 
(0.00) 
20.48** 
(0.00) 
27.41** 
(0.00) 
Risk 
0.85 
(0.77) 
1.25 
(0.65) 
1.34 
(0.59) 
0.75 
(0.44) 
Note: *   significant at 5% significance level  
           ** significant at 1% significance level 
           The value in the bracket is P-value 
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The values in Table 4.9 represent the odds ratio that the subjects are 
compliant due to one unit increase in the explanatory variables. In general, 
the results almost similar to the regression that used reported income as the 
proxy of compliance.  In treatment 1, two determinants affected the 
compliant behaviour significantly. Sanction rate and probability of audit, 
both are significant at 1% significance level, present the positive impact on 
the odd that subject will report the true amount of income. One unit 
increase in the sanction rate will increase the odds that subjects are being 
compliant by a factor of 2.59. On the other words, the odds of being 
compliant due to one unit increase in sanction rate is 159 % higher than 
without the increase. At the same time, one unit increase in probability of 
audit increases the odds of submitting the true report by a factor of 19.56.   
The only significant determinant in treatment 2 is the probability of the 
audit, which is significant at 1% at the level of significance. One unit increase 
in probability of audit enhances the odds of the subjects complying by a 
factor of 42.44.  In the treatment 3, sanction rate, probability of audit, and 
bribe rate significantly increase the compliance. On the other hand, the tax 
rate is found to have the opposite impact. All of those variables are 
significant at 1% significance level. One unit increase in sanction rate, 
probability of audit, and bribe rate will lead to the increase in the odds of 
complying by a factor of 3.73, 20.48, and 6.39 respectively.  On the other 
hand, the odds of complying due to one unit increase in tax rate is 0.04, 
indicating that the increase in tax rate lead to the decrease in tendency to 
comply.  To put it differently, the odds of cheating is 96% higher with one 
unit increase in tax rate.  
Similar results are found in treatment 4.  Excluding the financial reward rate 
and risk attitude, other determinant variables affect the odds of the subjects 
being compliant significantly. One unit increase in sanction rate, bribe rate, 
and probability of audit enhance the odds of subjects to be compliant by a 
factor 2.72, 1.96, and 27.41. The odds of complying due to one unit increase 
in the tax rate is 0.26, suggesting that the odds of cheating is 74% higher as 
sanction rate increase by one unit.  
Since the size of the financial reward rate is found insignificantly in affecting 
the compliance tendency of the subjects, this study intends to examine 
whether the availability of financial reward significantly influences the 
compliance behaviour.  Therefore, financial reward is translated into the 
dummy variable, with 0 representing the condition without the financial 
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reward and 1 if the financial reward is available.  The financial reward 
dummy is regressed on compliance decision, together with other controlled 
variables.  The results are presented below.   
 
Table 4.10 
Determinants of complying decision with financial reward dummy 
 
Determinants 
of compliance 
Treatment without 
bribery 
 
Treatment with 
bribery 
 
Tax rate 1.03 
(0.89) 
0.12** 
(0.00) 
Sanction rate 1.92** 
(0.01) 
3.67** 
(0.00) 
Bribe rate n.a 3.22** 
(0.00) 
Probability of 
audit 
29.02** 
(0.00) 
22.66** 
(0.00) 
Risk 1.06 
(0.87) 
0.90 
(0.74) 
Reward 
dummy 
23.46** 
(0.00) 
2.67* 
(0.05) 
Note: *   significant at 5% significance level  
           ** significant at 1% significance level 
           The value in the bracket is P-value 
 
The results confirm the previous findings of regression on reported income. 
The financial reward dummy is significantly affecting the odds of complying. 
The odds that subjects submit the true report under the absence of bribery 
is 23.46, indicating that the odds of complying is 2,246% higher when the 
financial reward is available. In the presence of bribery, the availability of 
financial reward increases the odds of complying by a factor of 2.67. Those 
results indicate that the availability of financial reward will augment the 
tendency to comply, even in the situation where bribery is prevailing. 
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4.6. DISCUSSION   
The main focus of this study is to observe the compliance behaviour, 
indicated by the size of the submitted report. The amount of income in the 
experiment (indicating the firms’ benefit associated with the emission) is 
fixed, assuming for the sake of simplicity that the polluting firms do not have 
the opportunity to adjust their production process. 
The comparison of optimal and actual reported income shows that subjects 
in average do not completely choose optimal choice, although the pattern of 
reported income follows the prediction of the optimal decision. Although 
most optimal decisions require subjects to report zero amounts, the reports 
in average are higher than zero.  It indicates that subjects are also inclined 
toward obeying the regulation of tax payment. However, the deviation from 
the optimal decision is as well applied in the case where the optimal report 
should be the full amount of income. On average, the report is less than the 
received income. These results may suggest that the subjects are not going 
through the necessary calculations to devise the optimal decision, 
nevertheless, the fact that subjects still pay the tax when the optimal 
decision should be a complete evasion is consistent with the findings of 
Torgler (2002) that taxpayers may also be driven by moral rules and 
sentiments.  Economic motive drives the subjects to be inclined toward 
underreporting the income, but the moral sentiment prevented them from 
totally avoiding the tax. 
The compliance in this experiment was approached using reported income 
and compliance decision.  Reported income could provide information 
regarding the degree of compliance, where the higher amount of income 
reported by subjects indicating a higher compliance. Compliance decision is 
a particular case of the reported income when the report is identical to the 
received income. The compliance decision is converted into binary variable, 
with the value of one if the reported income is correct and zero if the report 
is less than the actual income. 
In the absence of bribery, the amount of reported income and the incident 
of compliance are higher after financial reward for compliance is available. 
The test of mean-difference confirms that the difference before and after 
the application of reward is significant. It implies that the introduction of a 
reward can increase the compliance, by both increasing the reported 
amount and the complying decisions. However, the application of a financial 
reward fails to increase the reported income in the presence of bribery, 
while the occurrences of complying decision only slightly increase. It 
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demonstrates that the positive impact of financial reward is crowded out by 
the presence of bribery. 
Without the availability of financial reward, compliance behaviour of the 
subjects before and after the inclusion of bribery practice is not different 
statistically. The reported income under the presence of bribery is indeed 
lower by 4%, however, the mean-difference t-test fails to confirm that the 
difference is significant.  This result is in contrast to the study by Chander 
and Wilde (1992) and Bilotkach (2006), which find underreporting increases 
with the presence of corrupted tax official.  The reason for this might be that 
subjects are strongly driven by economic motive to minimize the loss of 
income, whether or not the bribery is practiced.  This finding is consistent 
with the research of Purohit (2007), which indicates that the extreme 
unwillingness of taxpayers to comply with the law is common in many 
middle-income countries.  
The panel analysis reveals that the tax rate does not affect the compliance in 
the absence of bribery.  This result is in line with the findings of Baldry 
(1987), Porcano (1988), and Beck, at al. (1991). However, tax rate shows a 
significant negative impact on compliance under the presence of bribery, 
thus, confirming the finding of Friedlandet al (1978) and Almet al (1992) that 
higher tax rates significantly lessen the tax compliance.  The argument for 
this ambiguity could be that the tax elasticity of the reported income 
increases under the presence of bribery. The subjects find that the cost of 
the sanction could be evaded all the time by paying the bribe, which is less 
than the amount of the sanction.  When the tax rate increases, subjects 
directly respond by decreasing their report.  When the financial reward is 
introduced into the setting with bribery practice, the negative impact of the 
tax rate is lesser than the impact without financial reward. 
The regression results show that the effect of audit probability on 
compliance is more considerable than the effect of sanction rate.  The values 
of coefficients indicate that the impact of audit probability is greater than 
the impact of sanction rate in all treatments. This result is in line with the 
finding of Friedland (1982) that audit intensity affects the compliance 
stronger than the severity of fine. 
The availability of financial reward significantly increases the compliance 
when the bribery is prevented. Once bribery is practiced, the availability of 
financial reward only significantly induces the tendency to comply but does 
not increase the reported income in general. Moreover, the tendency to 
comply due to financial reward is lower. It indicates that only subjects who 
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are inclined toward compliance will be encouraged to submit the true report 
by the presence of the reward. On the other hand, the rest of the 
subjects will not be affected by the reward if the gain of cheating is more 
compelling. Since the bribery provides them with lower costs of evasion, 
they will continue to underreport the income. Therefore, the application of 
financial reward is not able to augment the reported income in the presence 
of bribery. 
Incorporating the bribe rate as a determinant variable of tax compliance is a 
correct choice. The bribe rate significantly affects the compliance of subjects. 
Subjects perceived the bribe rate as the price of evading the punishment. A 
lower the bribe rate indicates that the price for evading the punishment of 
cheating decreases, thus, subjects are encouraged to lower their compliance. 
Accordingly, the increase in bribe rate tends to increase the tax compliance.  
The numerical impact of tax scheme on reported income could be simulated 
with the equation bstR 10.011.015.053.0  
13, where R, ρ, t, s, b 
indicate the reported emission, probability of audit, tax rate, sanction rate, 
and bribe rate respectively. Applying the values of parameters used in this 
experiment, and keeping the bribe rate constant, the proposed experimental 
tax scheme would be to set the probability of audit at 80% (meaning that the 
capacity of audit is able to cover 80% of the reports submitted by polluting 
firms), tax rate at 5% of reported emission denominated in monetary unit, 
sanction rate at 180% of unpaid tax. This scenario yields the reported 
emission amount to 55% of actual emission. Relaxing the assumption of 
constant bribe rate, the impact of emission tax scheme could be simulated 
with more modest values. Let the tax rate is set at 0.01%, probability of audit 
at 60%, sanction rate at 150%, and bribe rate assumed to be set by officials 
at 50% of the sanction, the reported emission would be 48% from actual 
emission.  
The impact of emission tax scheme on complying decision could be 
simulated with the equation bstR 96.172.226.041.27  
14
. Similar with 
the previous equation, the proposed experimental scheme would be to set 
the probability of audit at 80%, tax rate at 5%, and sanction rate at 180% 
while keeping the bribe rate constant. This simulation yields the odds of 
being compliant at a factor of 26.95. It indicates that the odds of complying 
is 2,595 % higher than the odds without the scheme instruments.  Setting 
                                            
13 Derived from the results of treatment 4 as presented in the Table 4.7. 
14 Derived from the results of treatment 4 as presented in the Table 4.9. 
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the tax rate at 0.01%, probability of audit at 60%, sanction rate at 150%, and 
bribe rate at 50%, yields the odds of being compliant by a factor of 21.51. 
Those two simulations do not include financial reward rate since the effect is 
not significant. However, while it has no impact on reported emission, the 
availability of financial reward (despite its value) is able to increase the odds 
of complying by the factor of 23.46.   
Evidently, the values of instruments in the two simulations are hypothetical. 
The main message is that the reported emission would be maximal if the tax 
and financial reward are set at the lowest rate as possible, while probability 
rate and sanction rate are at the highest possible level. However, it should be 
noted that setting the sanction at a higher rate might stimulate more 
pervasive bribery.   Therefore, the bribe rate should also be induced to be 
high, so that the cost of evading the sanction is severe. 
 
4.7. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION   
The study finds that the presence of bribery does not reduce the compliance 
much. Although bribery is fully prevented, the compliance behaviour is not 
much different. This finding confirms the fact that the nature of tax 
compliance behaviour in Indonesia is still low, regardless of the existence of 
bribery. 
However, bribery disrupts the effectiveness of emission tax schemes and 
enforcement policies. It augments the negative consequence of tax on the 
compliance, by encouraging aggressive tax evasion as the tax rate increases. 
This condition raises more restriction for the MoF in deciding the tax 
scheme, since the tax rate should be maintained at a low level. Bribery also 
reduces the positive impact of financial reward on compliance, which is able 
to enhance the compliance (despite the value of the reward) before the 
bribery becomes prevalent.  On the other hand, the introduction of financial 
reward can encourage the tendency to comply under the presence of 
bribery, although the impact is not as strong as that without bribery. 
Based on the findings in this study, the proposed emission tax schemes 
under the presence of bribery would be a combination of low tax rate and 
low financial reward. Considering that the audit probability and sanction 
have significant and strong impacts on the compliance, a high audit and 
severe sanction are also compulsory. Since the bribe rate also has a 
significant impact on the compliance decision, the enforcement policies 
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directed toward corrupt tax official that increase in the cost of the bribe and 
eventually lead to higher compliance are recommended. 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This dissertation is intended to provide the clue regarding the optimal 
emission tax design under imperfect monitoring and the presence of bribery, 
motivated by the case of Indonesia. The emission tax scheme in this study is 
depicted as the outcome of strategic interplay among the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF), tax officials, and the polluting firms. This study is expected to 
contribute to environmental policy and tax compliance literature, 
particularly by examining the role of financial reward on emission tax 
compliance under the presence of bribery and incorporating the cost of 
bribe explicitly as a determinant of compliance.  
This study employs game theoretical and experimental methods, the 
practical approaches to examine and to predict the performance of policy 
designs when the required empirical data is unavailable. Game theoretical 
method is particularly useful to analyze the strategic interaction in which the 
outcome of a party’s choices depends on the decision of others. The 
experimental approach is employed to compensate for the weaknesses of 
the theoretical method, which relies heavily on the assumption that the 
economic agents are fully rational and driven by the benefit maximization 
motive. This approach can fill the gap between actual economic behavior 
and the prediction of the theoretical model.  
Prior to theoretical and experimental analysis, this study firstly describes the 
problems of taxation in Indonesia. Results of the in-depth interview confirm 
the presence of firms’ noncompliance and tax officials’ corruption in 
Indonesia. The interview also reveals the inability of the monitoring 
mechanism to observe tax compliance of firms and to prevent corruption 
practice among tax officials. In addition, the findings of in-depth interview 
suggest the alternative way to enforce the compliance.  Instead of relying on 
the sanction, the interview suggests enforcing the compliance with the 
provision of financial reward to the firms with accurate tax reports and the 
officials who can reveal the noncompliance behavior of the firms. Another 
conclusion that could be drawn from the interview findings is the necessity 
for emission tax, although the measures against tax evasion should be taken. 
The theoretical study is intended to formulate the optimal emission tax 
scheme with costly monitoring under the presence of bribery.  This process 
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firstly requires the observation of optimal decision of the polluting firms and 
tax officials.   The polluting firms choose an optimal level of reported 
emission, given the emission tax scheme announced by the Mof and the cost 
of bribe demanded by the corrupt tax official.  The corrupt officials decide 
the rate of bribe to extract from the firms that submit inaccurate report, 
given the mixture of enforcement policy set by the MoF.   
The theoretical results indicate that optimal reported emission of polluting 
firms is decreasing with the tax rate and increasing with sanction, audit 
probability, financial reward for compliance, and bribe cost. When bribery 
becomes prevalent, the optimal reported emission of polluting firms is lower 
than that without bribery. The availability of financial reward raises the size 
of the optimal report, although the incremental report becomes smaller 
once the bribery take places.  However, the presence of financial reward can 
mitigate the adverse impact of emission tax rate on reported emission.   
The highest impact on reported emission under the presence of bribery is 
demonstrated by the cost of the bribe. The magnitude of change in reported 
emission due to the change in bribe rate is higher than the change triggered 
by other determinants. The second highest impact is due to the sanction.  
The impact of the sanction is superior to financial reward in increasing the 
report when the gap between the optimal reported emission and the actual 
emission is wide. 
Contrary to the optimal behavior of a polluting firm, the optimal behavior of 
a tax official in deciding the bribe rate is more affected by the financial 
reward than the penalty.  This difference is due to the different mechanism 
of reward disbursement between the polluting firms and tax officials.  The 
theoretical model set that compliant firms may only receive the reward after 
the accuracy of their reports is confirmed. However, the theoretical model 
allows the officials who can identify the violation against compliance to 
propose for financial reward directly by submitting the report to the MoF. On 
the other hand, the penalty for the corrupt officials is only imposed after 
their corrupt attitude is proved through inspection process.    
The optimal policy for the MoF is formulated under assumption that the 
implementation of each instrument in the emission tax scheme is costly, and 
thus the formulation of the policy should consider the benefit and the 
incurred costs of each instrument. Based on the observation on optimal 
behaviour of the polluting firms and tax officials, theoretical study proposes 
that the optimal emission tax schemes would be a mixture of low tax rate 
with high sanction rate and low financial reward for polluting firms, in 
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combination with high financial reward for tax officials who are able to 
discover the evasion and moderate penalty for the corrupt tax officials.  
The main focus of the experimental study is to predict the compliance 
behavior of the firms, given various emission tax schemes under different 
bribery settings. In particular, the experiment intends to observe the impact 
of financial reward on compliance behavior in the bribery setting. In the case 
of Indonesia, descriptive analysis on the experiment results find that the 
level of compliance is identical before and after bribery becomes prevalent. 
However, bribery restricts the effectiveness of the emission tax scheme and 
enforcement instruments. It augments the negative consequence of tax on 
compliance, by encouraging aggressive tax evasion as the tax rate increases. 
Bribery also curbs the positive impact of financial reward, which enhances 
compliance significantly before bribery takes place.  Nevertheless, the 
introduction of financial reward encourages the compliance tendency in the 
presence of bribery, although the impact is not as strong as it is without 
bribery.  The experimental study also finds that audit probability and 
sanction have a significantly positive impact on compliance. 
In general, the results of the experimental study are in line with the 
theoretical results, except for the impact of financial reward. The theoretical 
study assumes that firms will act optimally to maximize their profit, on the 
other hand, the experimental study assumes that firms also act on ethical 
consideration aside from profit maximization behaviour. The experimental 
firms, who consider that cheating is ethically wrong, are more encouraged to 
comply when the reward is available. However, the bribery creates a 
condition where the benefit of evasion is more appealing than the benefit of 
compliance, and thus the financial reward loses its deterrence power. 
Combining the findings of both theoretical and experimental studies, the 
proposed emission tax schemes under the presence of bribery would be a 
combination of low tax rate, low financial reward for compliant polluting 
firms, accompanied with a high sanction for evasion. Financial reward would 
be best to set at a low level since theoretical findings show that the impact 
of the reward on compliance is lower than the impact of the sanction. 
Furthermore, experimental results suggest that the important determinant 
of compliance in the absence of bribery is   simply the availability of the 
reward, regardless the value, while the reward hardly affects the compliance 
behaviour in the presence of bribery. Therefore, it will be optimal for the 
MoF to design a financial reward rate at low level lower than the sanction 
rate. Since the bribe also contributes a significant impact on compliance 
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decision, the enforcement policies directed toward corrupting tax officials 
that eventually lead to the increase in the cost of bribe is recommended. 
Theoretical findings indicate that the optimal deterrence policy to ensure 
the performance of tax officials under costly monitoring would be a high 
financial reward for revealing the tax evasion and a lower penalty for taking 
the bribe.  This recommendation also supported by the finding of in-depth 
interview, which reveals that the bribery in taxation is systemic. 
Consequently, the detection and prosecution of the officials engaging in 
bribery would be difficult and costly.  Therefore, the penalty that entails the 
detection of bribery would be less appealing than the reward, which does 
not require a prior costly inspection.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: List of Respondents 
 
Table A.1 
List of Respondents 
No. Agency Position 
1 Indonesian Employers 
Association 
Head of Indonesian Employers Association 
2 Tax Advisor Head of Tax Consultant Company  
3 Tax Audit and 
Investigation Office, 
Ministry of Finance 
Director of Tax Audit and Investigation Office 
4 Internal Compliance 
and Human Resource 
Transformation, 
Ministry of Finance 
Head of Internal Compliance and Human Resource 
Transformation, Ministry of Finance 
5 Indonesia Corruption 
Watch 
Senior staff  of Indonesia Corruption Watch 
6 Fiscal Policy Office, 
Ministry of Finance 
Senior staff of Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance  
7 Expert in 
Environmental 
Economics 
Diponegoro University professor 
8 Expert in Public 
Economics and 
Taxation 
Diponegoro University professor 
9 Expert in Industrial 
Economics 
Diponegoro University professor 
10 Expert in Public 
Economics 
Diponegoro University researcher  
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Appendix B:  Risk Profile Questionnaire 
 
B.1 Risk questionnaire 
 
Please complete the questionnaire by ticking one option for each question. 
There is no right or wrong answer; you can choose the option that suits your 
preference best.  
 
1. Which of the following best describes your attitude to financial risk?  
a) A very low risk taker 
b) A low risk taker 
c) An average risk taker 
d) A high risk taker 
e) A very high risk taker 
2. If my investment value decreases more than 10% over a short period of 
time, I would sell the remaining of my investment.  
a) Strongly agree 
b) Agree 
c) Neutral 
d) Disagree 
e) Strongly disagree 
3. I am willing to accept more risk and experience more uncertainty to 
possibly achieve higher returns.  
a) Strongly agree 
b) Agree 
c) Neutral 
d) Disagree 
e) Strongly disagree 
4. If my investment value decreases more than 10% over a short period of 
time, I would invest more fund since I can tolerate short term losses in 
expectation of future gain. 
a) Strongly agree 
b) Agree 
c) Neutral 
d) Disagree 
e) Strongly disagree 
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5. My main concern is security, keeping my money safe is more important 
than earning higher returns.  
a) Strongly agree 
b) Agree 
c) Neutral 
d) Disagree 
e) Strongly disagree 
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B.2 Risk scoring 
 
1. Score for each option in the questions 
 
Question Option Point 
a) 1 
b) 2 
c) 3 
d) 4 
1 
e) 5 
a) 1 
b) 2 
c) 3 
d) 4 
2 
e) 5 
a) 5 
b) 4 
c) 3 
d) 2 
3 
e) 1 
a) 5 
b) 4 
c) 3 
d) 2 
4 
e) 1 
a) 1 
b) 2 
c) 3 
d) 4 
5 
e) 5 
   
 
 
2. Risk classification 
 
a. Aggressive (22-25 point) 
A high risk taker, who is aiming to pursue potentially greater returns.  
His/her choices carry with them a higher level of risk. Security is 
secondary to the potential for gain accumulation. 
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b. Moderately aggressive (18-21 point) 
A risk taker, who is prepared to accept higher volatility and moderate 
risks in order to accumulate profit. Her/his combination of business 
choices will be similar to those of balanced businessman, but more 
aggressive actions are included. 
c. Balanced (14-17 point) 
A risk neutral, who requires diversified business choices to balance the 
expected gain and potential loss. A well calculated risky action will be 
acceptable for them to achieve good returns. 
d. Moderately conservative (10-13 point) 
A risk averse, who is seeking better than basic returns, but risk must 
be low. Typically a businessman seeking to protect the wealth that has 
been accumulated, she/he may be prepared to carefully consider less 
aggressive business actions. 
e. Conservative (6-9 point) 
A very risk averse, which requires that risk must be very low. She/he is 
willing to accept lower returns to protect her/his capital.  
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Appendix C: Experiment Instruction 
 
C.1 Instruction of the Treatment 1 
You are about to participate in an economic experiment. The experiment is 
taking form in a game. You can make considerable amount of money depend 
on the actions you take. The game will consist of 24 rounds. You are not 
allowed to communicate with other participants once the game is started. 
You will receive a real income indicated in Indonesian Rupiah every round, 
written in the income card. In each round, you are required to report the 
amount of income that you receive in that particular round. You have to 
write the amount of income that you intend to report in the reported income 
card. We will draw the tax from the money that you have received. The tax is 
calculated as a certain percentage of your reported income; therefore, the 
sizes of the tax that will be deducted from your income every round is 
depend on your report.  Due to the limitation of time and number of 
research assistants in this experiment, we cannot check whether all of you 
are reporting the amount of money honestly.  We are only able to audit a 
certain number of the report in each round. If your report is audited and the 
amount of the report is less than the real income, you will get the sanction 
for cheating. The sanction is calculated as a percentage of the unpaid tax. 
The percentage of the tax, the number of the reports that will be audited, 
and the percentage of the sanction will be announced in the announcement 
card in each round. The amount of money that will be deducted from your 
income as the sanction will be informed to you in the sanction card.  
A calculator is available to assist you with your decision. I would like to 
emphasize that the anonymity of your decision is guaranteed. Your decision 
is confidential and will not be known to others. When the experiment is 
started, you are only represented by the number, which is randomly picked 
up. You will receive your money after the experiment by showing your card 
to the financial assistant. 
 
C.2 Instruction of the Treatment 2 
You are about to participate in an economic experiment. The experiment is 
taking form in a game. You can make considerable amount of money depend 
on the actions you take. The game will consist of 24 rounds. You are not 
allowed to communicate with other participants once the game is started. 
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You will receive a real income indicated in Indonesian Rupiah every round, 
written in the income card. In each round, you are required to report the 
amount of income that you receive in that particular round. You have to 
write the amount of income that you intend to report in the reported income 
card. We will draw the tax from the money that you have received. The tax is 
calculated as a certain percentage of your reported income; therefore, the 
sizes of the tax that will be deducted from your income every round is 
depend on your report.  Due to the limitation of time and number of 
research assistants in this experiment, we cannot check whether all of you 
are reporting the amount of money honestly.  We are only able to audit a 
certain number of the report in each round. If your report is audited and the 
amount of the report is less than the real income, you will get sanction for 
cheating. The sanction is calculated as a percentage of the unpaid tax. 
However, if your report is found to be accurate, you will get reward for 
compliance. The reward is calculated as a percentage of the tax payment. 
The percentage of the tax, the number of the reports that will be audited, 
the percentage of the sanction, and the percentage of the reward will be 
announced in the announcement card in each round.   The amount of money 
that will be deducted from your income as the sanction will be informed to 
you in the sanction card, while the amount of money that will be added to 
your income as the reward will be announced in the reward card. 
A calculator is available to assist you with your decision. I would like to 
emphasize that the anonymity of your decision is guaranteed. Your decision 
is confidential and will not be known to others. When the experiment is 
started, you are only represented by the number, which is randomly picked 
up. You will receive your money after the experiment by showing your card 
to the financial assistant. 
 
C.3 Instruction of the Treatment 3 
You are about to participate in an economic experiment. The experiment is 
taking form in a game. You can make considerable amount of money depend 
on the actions you take. The game will consist of 24 rounds. You are not 
allowed to communicate with other participants once the game is started. 
You will receive a real income indicated in Indonesian Rupiah every round, 
written in the income card. In each round, you are required to report the 
amount of income that you receive in that particular round. You have to 
write the amount of income that you intend to report in the reported income 
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card. We will draw the tax from the money that you have received. The tax is 
calculated as a certain percentage of your reported income; therefore, the 
sizes of the tax that will be deducted from your income every round is 
depend on your report.  Due to the limitation of time and number of 
research assistants in this experiment, we cannot check whether all of you 
are reporting the amount of money honestly.  We are only able to audit a 
certain number of the report in each round. If your report is audited and the 
amount of the report is less than the real income, you will get sanction for 
cheating. The sanction is calculated as a percentage of the unpaid tax. 
However, you may avoid the sanction by agreeing to pay the bribe. The bribe 
is calculated as a percentage of sanction. 
The percentage of the tax, the number of the reports that will be audited, 
the percentage of the sanction, and the percentage of the bribe will be 
announced in the announcement card in each round.   The amount of money 
that will be deducted from your income as the sanction, as well as the 
amount of bribe that you may pay to escape the sanction, will be informed 
to you in the sanction card. 
A calculator is available to assist you with your decision. I would like to 
emphasize that the anonymity of your decision is guaranteed. Your decision 
is confidential and will not be known to others. When the experiment is 
started, you are only represented by the number, which is randomly picked 
up. You will receive your money after the experiment by showing your card 
to the financial assistant. 
 
C.4 Instruction of the Treatment 4 
You are about to participate in an economic experiment. The experiment is 
taking form in a game. You can make considerable amount of money depend 
on the actions you take. The game will consist of 24 rounds. You are not 
allowed to communicate with other participants once the game is started. 
You will receive a real income indicated in Indonesian Rupiah every round, 
written in the income card. In each round, you are required to report the 
amount of income that you receive in that particular round. You have to 
write the amount of income that you intend to report in the reported income 
card. We will draw the tax from the money that you have received. The tax is 
calculated as a certain percentage of your reported income; therefore, the 
sizes of the tax that will be deducted from your income every round is 
depend on your report.  Due to the limitation of time and number of 
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research assistants in this experiment, we cannot check whether all of you 
are reporting the amount of money honestly.  We are only able to audit a 
certain number of the report in each round. If your report is audited and the 
amount of the report is less than the real income, you will get sanction for 
cheating. The sanction is calculated as a percentage of the unpaid tax. 
However, you may avoid the sanction by agreeing to pay the bribe. The bribe 
is calculated as a percentage of sanction. On the other hand, you will get 
reward for compliance if your report is found to be accurate. The reward is 
calculated as a percentage of the tax payment. 
The percentage of the tax, the number of the reports that will be audited, 
the percentage of the sanction, the percentage of the bribe, and the 
percentage of the reward will be announced in the announcement card in 
each round.   The amount of money that will be deducted from your income 
as the sanction, as well as the amount of bribe that you may pay to escape 
the sanction, will be informed to you in the sanction card. The amount of 
money that will be added to your income as the reward will be announced in 
the reward card. 
A calculator is available to assist you with your decision. I would like to 
emphasize that the anonymity of your decision is guaranteed. Your decision 
is confidential and will not be known to others. When the experiment is 
started, you are only represented by the number, which is randomly picked 
up. You will receive your money after the experiment by showing your card 
to the financial assistant. 
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Appendix D: Experiment Instruments 
 
 
Figure D.1 
Announcement card in treatment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.2 
Announcement card in treatment 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.3 
Announcement card in treatment 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Announcement card 
 
Tax rate X % of reported income 
Sanction rate X % of unpaid tax 
Audit 
probability 
X person of total participant 
 
 
Announcement card 
 
Tax rate X % of reported income 
Reward rate X % of paid tax 
Sanction rate X % of unpaid tax 
Audit 
probability 
X person of total participant 
 
 
Announcement card 
 
Tax rate X % of reported income 
Sanction rate X % of unpaid tax 
Bribe rate X % of sanction amount 
Audit 
probability 
X person of total participant 
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Figure D.4 
Announcement card in treatment 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.5 
Income card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.6 
Reported income card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income card 
 
In this round you are entitled to 
 
 
……. IDR 
Reported income card 
The amount of money that you 
intend to report: 
 
……..IDR 
 
(Your reported amount will be the 
basis for the tax payment that will 
be deducted from your income) 
 
Announcement card 
 
Tax rate X % of reported income 
Reward rate X % of paid tax 
Sanction rate X % of unpaid tax 
Bribe rate X % of sanction amount 
Audit 
probability 
X person of total participant 
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Figure D.7 
Sanction card in treatment 1 and 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.8 
Sanction card in treatment 3 and 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.9 
Reward card 
 
 
Sanction card 
You have to pay the sanction for 
cheating: 
 
……. IDR 
Reward card 
You get the reward for reporting 
your income accurately: 
 
xxxx  IDR     
 
Sanction card 
You have to pay the sanction for 
cheating: 
 
xxxx  IDR    (1) 
 
Or pay the bribe: 
 
xxxx  IDR    (2) 
 
(thick one of the two options ) 
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Appendix E: Preceding Test for Mean-Difference Test and Panel Data 
Analysis  
 
 
Table E.1 
The results of Variance Equality Test: reported income 
 
Treatments Bartlett's Chi2 
  
1 and 2 5.84** 
(0.02) 
1 and 3 0.28 
(0.60) 
2 and 4 15.45** 
(0.00) 
3 and 4 4.12* 
(0.04) 
    
Note: *   significant at 5% significance level  
          ** significant at 1% significance level 
         Value in the bracket is P-value   
 
 
Table E.2 
The results of Variance Equality Test: percentage of accurate reports 
 
Treatments Bartlett's Chi2 
  
1 and 2 1.12 
(0.29) 
1 and 3 0.02 
(0.90) 
2 and 4 7.13** 
(0.01) 
3 and 4 2.99 
(0.08) 
 
Note: *   significant at 5% significance level  
          ** significant at 1% significance level 
         Value in the bracket is P-value   
 
 
 121 
 
Table E.3 
The results of Hausmann Test: determinant of reported income 
 
Treatments chi2(3) 
Prob>c
hi2 
Treatment 1 0.02 0.9994 
Treatment 2 0.00 1.0000 
Treatment 3 -0.00 - 
Treatment 4 1.94 0.9249 
 
 
 
Table E.4 
The results of Hausmann Test: determinant of compliance decision 
 
Treatments 
chi2(3)
15 
Prob>c
hi2 
Treatment 1 -0.62    - 
Treatment 2 -0.53    - 
Treatment 3 -0.23    - 
Treatment 4 -0.48    - 
 
 
 
                                            
15 Most empirical and theoretical literature dismisses the problem of negative values for 
estimated variance, and suggests replacing the negative variance by zero value (Magazzini 
and Calzolari, 2010).  
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